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81 
LAW’S VIOLENCE AND THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN CORPORAL DISCIPLINE AND 
PHYSICAL ABUSE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST 
AFRICA 
Harry Schwirck 
“Were the inhibition against violence perfect, law would be 
unnecessary; were it not capable of being overcome through social 
signals, law would not be possible.”1 
People generally see law and violence as antagonistic.2  In this 
view, law serves to minimize violence in society and is no more coercive 
than necessary.  Violence is disruptive and by countering violence, law 
contributes to social order.  Applications of force by agents of the law 
entail a necessary response to illegitimate violence.3  This legal violence, 
then, is ultimately anti-violent, serving in the end to reduce the level of 
violence in society overall.  In this respect, law has a negative relation to 
violence. 
Robert Cover and others challenge this view, positing a positive or 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613 (1986). 
 2. I use the terms “violence,” “force,” and “coercion” to mean the application of physical 
force; it will be clear from context when these words are used otherwise.  I employ this usage to 
distinguish the use of physical force from forms of suasion or coercion that lack physical force, such 
as discipline. 
 3. As used in this article, “law” does not just mean the law contained in legal codes, derived 
from custom, or established by precedent.  Rather, a more expansive view of law is indicated: 
“When the state’s agents apply their understanding of law and bring to bear the specter and reality 
of force and violence that is the state’s, this is the state’s law.”  THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW 
THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 6 (1996).  Law in this view encompasses the actions taken 
in the expression and execution of law by everyone who administers law.  For the problems in 
defining law see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (1994) (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the function of the law); HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAW 1 (A.H. 
Campbell ed., Octagon Books 1980) (discussing the philosophy of the law generally); and Laura 
Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (Peter Sack & Jonathan 
Aleck eds., 1992) (providing a discussion of the main themes about law that have concerned 
anthropologists). 
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generative relation between law and violence.4  Cover argues that 
physical sanction ultimately underlies any legal system.  “A legal world 
is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies 
on the line.”5  For Cover, if law were not embedded in a system that 
implements its, sometimes violent, commands, then it would not be law 
at all.6 
This article explores another positive relationship between law and 
violence.  Law does not merely respond to violence in an effort to 
diminish it but also determines and reflects what might be termed an 
economy of violence.  Law plays a central role in defining what a 
society will recognize as violence and in allocating the ability to 
legitimately act in a violent manner. 
This positive relationship between law and violence can be seen 
most readily in instances in which legitimate and illegitimate violence 
shade into one another, because then each partakes the most of the other.  
This article examines one such instance in detail.  During German 
colonial rule over South West Africa (present day Namibia),7 the 
contradictory tendencies in law’s relationship to violence played 
themselves out in the response of law and legal institutions to settlers’ 
violence against Africans.  The physical abuse of Africans—usually 
workers—at the hands of settlers was a regular feature of the colony’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 4. See Cover, supra note 1, at 1601, passim (“Legal interpretation takes place in a field of 
pain and death.”); Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (“But the 
jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all communities never exists in 
isolation from violence. Interpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion.”); WALTER 
BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 281, 283 (Peter Demtz ed., Edmund Jephcott 
trans., 1978) (“If, therefore, conclusions can be drawn from military violence, as being primordial 
and paradigmatic of all violence used for natural ends, there is inherent in all such violence a 
lawmaking character.”); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward 
a Jurisprudence of Violence, in THE FATE OF LAW 209, 212 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns 
eds., 1991) (“In our view, any theory of law must locate violence at the center of its concerns”). 
 5. Cover, supra note 1, at 1605. 
 6. See id. at 1613, 1617. 
 7. Throughout this article I refer to present-day Namibia as South West Africa or German 
Southwest Africa (a practice uncomfortably shared by Afrikaners with quasi-irredentist sentiments).  
My reason for this is simply to avoid confusion because my sources almost invariably use the name 
“South West Africa.”  In places in which it is obvious that I am referring to either early Namibian 
nationalism or to present-day Namibia, I will use the word Namibia.  Although I also use the word 
“native” without scare quotes throughout the article, they are always intended.  “Natives” 
[Eingeborenen] or “Blacks” are the words that appear throughout the primary sources, and I use 
them only to paraphrase the attitudes and sentiments therein. Otherwise I use the term Africans or 
Namibians, which seems more appropriate in this case.  When I am referring to a specific African 
people, I will use their tribal name, for example, “Herero” or “Nama.”  Interestingly, most primary 
sources use the word “African” only to mean European settlers of Africa, but this usage is 
infrequent.  Where the document uses the term “whites,” I use it as well.  Otherwise, I attempt to 
substitute a more specific name such as “Germans” or “settlers.” 
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social landscape.8  Legal institutions and colonial officials vacillated 
between treating this abuse as criminal assault and as an exercise of “the 
right to paternal discipline [väterliches Züchtigungsrecht].”  Ultimately, 
colonial law accommodated settlers’ violent treatment of Africans by 
recognizing it as a type of extralegal yet legitimate violence. 
This article is organized as follows.  Part One sketches the way the 
article will approach the issue of law and violence.  Part Two provides a 
very brief summary of the history of German colonial rule in South West 
Africa.  Part Three discusses the status of the right of discipline in 
German law up to and during the colonial period.  Part Four turns to the 
colonial situation itself, examining the colonial debate over the right to 
discipline in the context of settlers’ abuse of farm workers.  Part Five 
follows this debate into the diamond mines discovered toward the end of 
the German colonial period and mined by African migrant workers 
under frequently abusive foremen. 
I.  LAW AND VIOLENCE 
Law is usually seen as opposed in spirit to violence generally, and 
the relation between the two is assumed to be negative.  In this view, the 
state’s monopoly on legitimate violence renders society less violent 
overall.9  This view accords with a part of the classical liberal tradition, 
which offers a myth of the state’s10 origin from a state of nature. In the 
state of nature—at least after a pre-scarcity Edenic interlude—
individuals preyed on one another.  To secure life and property against 
each another, people “agreed” to subject themselves to the coercive 
practices of a state.11  According to this founding myth, then, the state’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 8. See, e.g., HELMUT BLEY, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1894-1914, at 
266-67 (Hugh Ridley trans., 1971) (discussing the political, social, and economic systems of 
German South-West Africa); HORST DRECHSLER, LET US DIE FIGHTING: THE STRUGGLE OF THE 
HERERO AND NAMA AGAINST GERMAN IMPERIALISM (1884-1915), at 234-37 (Bernd Zöllner trans., 
Zed Press 1980) (discussing the physical abuse used by Germans against the native population). 
 9. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Oxford University Press 1946) (1919) (defining the state as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force”). 
 10. Throughout this article I use “state” to mean the modern state under the rule of law. 
 11. For example, while explicitly rejecting social contract theory, John Stuart Mill derives 
state authority from the individual’s reciprocal obligation engendered by the protection offered by 
society.  In return for this protection, an individual has a duty to “observe a certain line of conduct 
towards the rest.”  ON LIBERTY 70 (David Spitz ed., 1975).  Mill writes that this conduct includes 
not only one’s own behavior toward another, but also the obligation to support a policing function.  
See also, JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 32-33 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690) (“For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, 
which cannot be where there is not law; but freedom is not, as we are told: a liberty for every man to 
3
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monopoly on violence remedies the more violent individual predations 
in a state of nature. 
Criminal law provides the paradigmatic example of the state’s 
violence in this traditional view.  Here, the state employs coercive 
measures against members of society who commit violence against other 
members.12  Admittedly, very few would care to live in a society that did 
not police violence in this way—indeed, this policing function, in part, 
constitutes society itself.  However, the liberal tradition only views such 
violence as a potential problem if it surpasses the minimum necessary 
for maintaining the negative space of individual liberty.13  Kept at the 
level sufficient to maintain internal order and external defense, the 
state’s violence seems unexceptionable. 
The liberal description of the origin and extent of the state’s 
coercive power in many respects parallels that of much more critical 
internalization theories.  For example, in The Civilizing Process, Norbert 
Elias showed, through a discussion of the development of table manners, 
how outward directed violence gave way to internalized norms of 
behavior.14  Social control became less a matter of direct coercion and 
more a matter of socialization.15  Michel Foucault, of course, has 
described this process extensively, in his many descriptions of the 
process of social discipline.  Foucault rejects the idea of enlightened 
progress in, for example, the punishment of crime, the treatment of the 
insane, and the liberation of sexuality.16  Instead, he reinterprets what 
                                                                                                                                 
do what he lists . . . but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and 
his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be 
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.”). 
 12. Criminal law, of course, accomplishes far more than policing violence.  See Stuart A. 
Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal 
State, 23 L. &  SOC. INQUIRY 857, 859 (1998) (providing an overview of the field of political 
criminology, which “focus[es] on the nature and the distribution of power as it shapes the social and 
political construction of crime and influences crime control policies”). 
 13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying the state’s use of 
force as a response “to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the 
laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions”). 
 14. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 1 (Edmund 
Jephcott trans., Urizen Books 1978) (1939) (discussing the relationship between violence and 
normative behavior). 
 15. Id. at 257 (“The transformation of interpersonal external compulsion into individual 
internal compulsion . . . leads to a situation in which many affective impulses cannot be lived out as 
spontaneously as before.  The autonomous individual self-controls produced in this way in social 
life, such as ‘rational thought’ or the ‘moral conscience,’ now interpose themselves more sternly 
than ever before between spontaneous and emotional impulses, on the one hand, and the skeletal 
muscles, on the other, preventing the former with greater severity from directly determining the 
latter (i.e., action) without the permission of these control mechanism.”). 
 16. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 302 (Alan 
4
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most take to be progress as an ever-increasing articulation of internalized 
means of social control—the body’s saturation with discursive power 
structures.17  The internalization of powers minimizes the need for 
authority to express itself through direct physical coercion.18  While 
powerful and no doubt true, internalization theory often fails to account 
for not only the persistence, but also the increasing magnitude of 
outward expressions of violence. 
Construing law’s violence as secondary to its discipline, however, 
obscures the ways in which violence and law are more intimately bound.  
The historian Alf Lüdtke points out “the simultaneity of the physically 
violent character of the ‘modern state’ and the symbolic presence of this 
violence—including within the forms of social reproduction.”19  That is, 
violence has both a direct and indirect relation to law; both “hard” and 
“soft” violence characterize the modern state and its laws.  So the 
development of law, like other forms of discipline, does not only entail 
an increase in the internalization of laws’ norms and a corresponding 
decrease in the physical expression or maintenance of the same through 
                                                                                                                                 
Sheridan trans., 1979) (exploring the history of punishment from early modern times to the 20th 
century); FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF 
REASON 1 (Richard Howard trans., 1965) (discussing the treatment of the insane); FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 1 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (discussing the discourse of sexuality).  See 
also PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 191-97 (Richard Nice trans., 1977) 
(describing how violence can be displaced in power structures by putatively universal cultural 
values). 
 17. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 11 (“Hence, too, my 
main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the discourses it 
permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it 
access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday 
pleasure—all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also 
incitement and intensification: in short, the ‘polymorphous techniques of power.’”). 
 18. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 16, at 302 (“But, conversely, 
the carceral pyramid gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to 
be free of all excess and all violence.  In the subtle gradation of the apparatuses of discipline and of 
the successive ‘embeddings’ that they involve, the prison does not at all represent the unleashing of 
a different kind of power, but simply an additional degree in the intensity of a mechanism that has 
continued to operate since the earliest forms of legal punishment.”).  For a discussion of Foucault’s 
concept of power in the context of legal scholarship, see Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 
VA. L. REV. 721 (1996).  Winter criticizes legal scholarship for either reifying power or reducing it 
to the ability to apply force.  He describes Foucault’s conception of power as a corrective that 
“neither facilely subjectivizes power nor falsely elides agency.”  Id. at 728.  “For Foucault, socio-
cultural construction is an all-pervasive process from which no one escapes and in which everyone 
participates.  Power as such is neither a “thing” nor a quality, capacity, or possession of particular 
people.  Rather, power is an emergent quality that can only take shape through the joint agency of 
all those who participate in a given set of social relations.”  Id. 
 19. ALF LÜDTKE, POLICE AND STATE IN PRUSSIA, 1815-1850 8 (Peter Burgess trans., 1989) 
(discussing state domination in transition to industrial capitalism). 
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violence.  Rather, the modern state under the rule of law also uses direct 
force to achieve its ends.  Lüdtke’s approach to law, like that of 
internalization theory, remains instrumental.  He relates law to the 
“continuing necessity of extra-economic force for the safeguarding of 
the production process (and social reproduction) both demonstratively 
and in the abstract.”20 
Anne Marie Smith also notes internalization theory’s inattention to 
violence, writing that “[a]lthough Foucault asserts that bio-power fully 
displaced sovereign power during the early modern period, we are now 
witnessing the deployment of new forms of brutal subtractive power in 
key points within complex Western societies.”21  Smith cites Foucault’s 
“fail[ure] to give adequate attention to the presence of subtractive 
strategies within contemporary disciplinary regimes.”22 As a corrective 
to this gap in Foucauldian theory, Smith suggests “we should think 
instead in terms of hybrid formations [of power] in which subtractive 
modes—domination, exclusion, genocide and so on—are combined with 
productive modes—the organization of consent.”23 
A conception of law as fundamentally opposed to violence also 
characterizes critical treatments of colonial law.  In her review of this 
field, Sally Engle Merry argues that colonial law had a dual nature.24  On 
the one hand, colonial law had a disciplinary function, “reshap[ing] 
culture and consciousness,” and advanced the material interests of 
colonizers, “serv[ing] to extract land from precolonial users and to create 
a wage labor force out of peasant and subsistence producers.”25  On the 
other hand, and to a lesser extent, law provided a way for the colonized 
to contest extractive colonial practices.26  Merry adds, “law provided a 
way for the colonial state to restrain the more brutal aspects of settlers’ 
                                                                                                                                 
 20. Id.  Also, for Lüdtke law’s violence is atavistic in that we tend to associate its direct forms 
of compulsion with older social institutions and practices, while viewing its “soft” forms as modern.  
Id. 
 21. ANNA MARIE SMITH, LACLAU & MOUFFE: THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC IMAGINARY 163 
(1998) (providing an overview and critique of the work of Laclau and Mouffe). 
 22. Id.  See also Sarat & Kearns, supra note 4, at 266 (“So long as critical legal theory seeks 
only to expose the will and desire that inevitably are part of the interpretive task and rests content 
with deconstructing law’s ideologies, we will be blind to the ways in which ideological oppression 
ultimately depends on law’s monopoly of violence.”). 
 23. SMITH, supra note 21, at 163. 
 24. Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 889, 891 (1991) 
(discussing the role of law in the colonizing process). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (“[I]t provided a way for these groups to mobilize the ideology of the colonizers to 
protect lands and to resist some of the more excessive demands of the settlers for land and labor.”). 
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exploitation of land and labor.”27  We will see below, that while colonial 
law may have constrained some colonial violence, it also domesticated, 
redefined, and enabled such violence. 
This article departs from both liberal and internalization theories in 
that it does not understand the modern state under the rule of law as a 
turn away from violence.  Rather, the state represents a particular way of 
organizing and distributing violence.  This thesis enables an 
understanding of some of the modern era’s most salient events—state 
sponsored acts of violence like war, genocide, depression, and avoidable 
famine—as something other than exceptional.  This thesis must take 
violence’s irreducibility as its starting point, but this assumption appears 
unobjectionable, at least as a matter of historical fact.28 
This article also departs from many discussions of legitimate 
violence in that it does not take this violence as primarily instrumental.29  
While violence no doubt has instrumental uses, it is essentially irrational 
with respect to power structures.  That is, even legitimate violence does 
not necessarily serve rational interests, nor is it purely a matter of 
discipline.  In fact, as we will see, in South West Africa the colonial 
government allowed and enabled violence that undermined colonial 
interests. 
II.  THE COLONIAL CONTEXT 
The main groupings of peoples in 19th century Namibia were the 
Ovambo, the Berg-Damara, the Herero, the Nama, and the “Bushmen.”30  
The Ovambo, who lived in the far north of the territory near the border 
                                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES: ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE 
PASSIONS OF WAR (1997) (providing a fascinating account of the violence’s universality and 
persistence). 
 29. See, e.g., Laura E. Gomez,  Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the 
American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1129,  1133 
(2000) (arguing that “racial power sharing” in the administration of the criminal justice system in 
territorial New Mexico served the interests of Mexican and European-American elites); Robert P. 
Ingalls, Lynching and Establishment Violence in Tampa, 1858-1935, 53 J.S. HIST. 613 (1987) 
available at http://www.jstor.org (tying the rise and fall of lynching to changing economic 
interests). 
 30. The demo/ethno-graphics of 19th century Namibia were complicated and are confusing, 
in parts thanks to changing conventions of nomination.  This article will use Europeanized rather 
than Xhosian spellings of places and people, since this is the practice of most of my sources.  Robert 
Gordon argues that the somewhat pejorative name “bushmen” should be retained in favor of more 
ethnologically accurate names, such as San, because the latter names divide a group that colonial 
oppression consigned to a common fate and resistance.  See ROBERT GORDON, THE BUSHMAN 
MYTH: THE MAKING OF A NAMIBIAN UNDERCLASS 4-8 (1992) (discussing the politics of labeling 
bushmen). 
7
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of Angola, remained isolated from the other groups and German 
occupiers until late in the first decade of the 20th century when they 
were hired as migrant mine workers.  Mostly concentrated in the 
Northeastern part of Namibia, the “Bushmen” do not seem to have 
played a role in the events with which I am concerned.  The Berg-
Damara apparently had been assimilated by groups of Herero and Nama 
who had moved into their territory, displacing and sometimes enslaving 
them.31  These last two groups, who played the greatest role vis-à-vis 
German colonialism, had themselves occupied the territory in earlier 
times.  The Herero had migrated from the north centuries before; the 
Nama were more recent arrivals from the south.  The many Nama 
communities could be grouped into two larger units: the Nama proper, 
who had settled in Namibia much earlier, and the Oorlam Nama, who 
migrated to Namibia in the nineteenth century.  The Oorlam Nama had 
moved to Namibia from the south to escape servitude on Boer towns and 
farms and were often of mixed African and European descent.32  These 
groups seemed quickly to have gained dominant positions in Nama 
politics.  In the 1880’s, the Herero dominated the country north of 
Windhoek; Nama groups held sway in the South.  These two most 
powerful nations in the territory colonized by Germany fought one 
another throughout the century and again in the early part of the 
decade.33 
Excluding the earlier presence of missionaries, German 
involvement in Namibia lasted from 1884-1915.  The German colonial 
period can be divided into four phases.  During the period from German 
“acquisition” of South West Africa until the submission of Hendrik 
Witbooi in 1894, Africans remained by and large independent of 
German rule.34  Expansion of German territory and administration 
depended on the sufferance of African communities.  The end of 
Witbooi’s original struggle with the Germans in 1894 marked the start of 
German military and administrative consolidation of power under the 
governorship of Theodor Leutwein.35  With Witboois often fighting 
                                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., Max Schmidt, Die Nama, Bergdama und Namib-Buschleute, in 2 DAS 
EINGEBORENENRECHT: SITTEN UND GEWOHNHEITSRECHTE DER EINGEBORENEN DER EHEMALIGEN 
DEUTSCHEN KOLONIEN IN AFRIKA UND IN DER SÜDSEE 273 (Erich Schultz-Ewerth & Leonhard 
Adam eds., 1930). 
 32. Brigitte Lau, Introduction to THE HENDRIK WITBOOI PAPERS iii-iv (Brigitte Lau ed., 
1990).  One of the last of these groups to migrate, in fact, were called Rehoboth Basters (bastards). 
 33. See J.H. ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1880-1894: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
GERMAN AUTHORITY IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 35-36 (1968) (discussing the Herero-Nama War). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Denkschrift über Eingeborenenpolitik und Hereroaufstand in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 
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alongside of them, the Germans put down uprisings among and forced 
treaties on many Nama communities.  Dependent on German support 
against his rivals and paid handsomely for his acquiescence to German 
rule, Herero leader Samuel Maharero also cooperated with the 
colonizers.36  Herero loss of property during this time, in part through 
coerced indebtedness to German traders and in part through a rinderpest 
epidemic, provided the conditions for the Herero uprising in 1904.37  
During the third phase (1904-7), the Herero and Nama revolted 
separately against German rule.  Around 85% of the Herero and about 
half of the Nama, including Hendrik Witbooi, were killed or died as a 
result of the effects of these revolts.38  The methods employed by the 
Germans to put down the uprising, and especially the “Extermination 
Order” of Leutwein’s replacement General Lothar von Trotha, have 
since gained notoriety as particularly brutal colonial practices.39  The 
period from 1907 until Germany lost its colonies in World War I saw the 
partial dissolution of African communities, a system of forced labor for 
most Africans, and the imprisonment or deportation of many others. 
The use of corporal punishment by private citizens was common in 
German South West Africa.  White employers and foremen, on farms 
and in mines, regularly “disciplined” native workers.  Inevitably “the 
                                                                                                                                 
6, 518 STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE DES REICHESTAGES, 11 Legislatur-Periode I (1903/1905) 
[hereinafter Denkschrift].  Leutwein is necessarily a major figure in any treatment of German 
colonialism in South West Africa.  See DRECHSLER, supra note 8, passim; BLEY, supra note 8, 
passim.  Leutwein’s own memoir of his governorship is THEODOR LEUTWEIN,  ELF JAHRE 
GOUVERNEUR IN DEUTSCH-SÜDWESTAFRIKA passim (1907). 
 36. The Herero leader Samuel Maharero’s part in squandering tribal property is discussed in 
Gerhardus Pool’s book, SAMUEL MAHARERO.  E.g. GERHARD POOL, SAMUEL MAHARERO 115-17 
(1991). 
 37. See DRECHSLER, supra note 8, at 117-19.  See also BLEY, supra note 8, at 124. 
 38. DRECHSLER, supra note 8, at 214.  The Herero are currently seeking restitution from the 
German government for German actions in South West Africa.  See Sidney L. Harring, German 
Reparations To The Herero Nation: An Assertion Of Herero Nationhood In The Path Of Namibian 
Development?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 393 (2002). 
 39. The German actions during the uprisings are often, and I believe correctly, described as 
genocidal.  See Jeremy Silvester et al., The Herero Holocaust? The Disputed History Of The 1904 
Genocide, available at http://www.namibweb.com/hererohol.htm (“Today there almost seems to be 
a consensus that the genocide really did happen.”).  See also JON M. BRIDGMAN, THE REVOLT OF 
THE HEREROS (1981) (providing an account of German violence against the Herero).  Some 
progressive scholars have taken issue with this characterization. See Brigitte Lau, Uncertain 
certainties: The Herero-German war of 1904,  MIBAGUS: JOURNAL OF FREE THOUGH AND 
CULTURE, April 1989, at 4-6 & 8, available at 
http://www.traditionsverband.de/magazin/ungewiss.html (discussing German atrocities).  Tilman 
Dedering rebuts Lau’s argument in The German-Herero War of 1904: Revisionism of Genocide or 
Imaginary Historiography?, J. OF S. AFRN. STUD. 80 (1993) (discussing the German-Herero War).  
Silvester et al. have more recently described the late Lau’s arguments as “largely discredited.”  
Silvester, supra. 
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right to paternal discipline” became an issue in the continuing debate 
about native policy.  In Germany this right had no certain legal status 
outside of schools and the home, but in the colony few settlers or 
administrators questioned it.40  Rather, it was excesses in the exercise of 
discipline that sparked controversy—controversy over where discipline 
ended and criminal abuse [Mißhandlung] began.  Ultimately these 
disputes fractured into contradictory legal claims about the status of 
native workers, and indeed all natives, in colonial society.  
Administrators generally viewed the treatment of native workers as a 
public issue, to be regulated by colonial officials and limited by the 
German criminal code.  Employers, on the other hand, saw the issue as 
an essentially private one, involving their rights under civil law to 
manage their businesses as they wished.  This distinction proved crucial 
because while the criminal code allowed no apparent room for unequal 
victims (the characteristics of the victim did not affect the nature of the 
crime), civil rights and obligations varied according to status.  In the 
colony, in other words, the law made no explicit distinction between 
natives and whites as crime victims, while the two group’s civil status 
differed greatly.  Colonial administrators’, courts’, and newspapers’ 
handling of salient cases of abused native workers involved negotiating 
the disposition of status under different realms of law.  The nearest thing 
to a consensus in legal practice resulting from these controversies was 
the understanding that cases of excessive discipline would prompt 
criminal prosecution, but that in such cases natives indeed would not be 
accorded the full status of victim implicit in the criminal code.  Whether 
engaged by criminal or civil law, natives occupied a position unequal to 
whites. 
Why did this compromise come about?  What function did it serve?  
Several possible answers present themselves.  The first answer posits the 
practice of discipline by settlers as a quasi-police authority, functioning 
to increase settler security.  The second answer proposes that colonial 
discipline served as a means to control and discipline labor, that is, it 
benefited the various German economic interests in the colony.  
However, if we search for the threshold between discipline and abuse in 
the colony, we find it beyond where the need for security or disciplining 
labor might have established it.  There was an excess in the colonial 
practice of discipline that escapes these two categories.  Here colonial 
                                                                                                                                 
 40. Though corporal discipline still occurred in the military, there it was on uncertain legal 
footing.  See REINHART KOSELLECK, PREUßEN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND REVOLUTION: 
ALLGEMEINE LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG UND SOZIALE BEWEGUNG VON 1791 BIS 1848 655-59 
(1967). 
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ideology itself must be accorded explanatory priority, and corporal 
discipline seen first and foremost as a way to realize and perpetuate a 
racially differentiated social structure.  Casting settlers’ violence against 
Africans as something other than violence was one expression of this 
differentiation. 
In the next section, I will examine the arguments of the various 
participants in the colonial debate over the boundary between discipline 
and abuse.  The first part of this section will highlight the legal issues 
inherent in the “right to paternal discipline” and trace its historical 
development in modern German law up to the colonial period.  The next 
part turns to the application of the right to discipline (right to discipline) 
in German colonies—particularly in South West Africa—and the brief 
and incomplete debate that accompanied it.  The final part entails a close 
reading of a particular case involving the abuse of African mine workers 
and the resultant controversies beyond the courtroom. 
III.  RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE AND THE PRUSSIAN LAW OF DOMESTICS 
A.  Right to Discipline and Criminal Abuse. 
The central legal issue raised by a right to discipline is how to 
distinguish lawful discipline from criminal abuse.41  The German 
Imperial Criminal Code [Strafgesetzbuch, hereafter StGB], promulgated 
in 1870, defined the crime of common assault in this manner: “Anyone 
who intentionally does injury to the body or health of another shall be 
guilty of assault and liable to confinement not exceeding three years or 
to a fine not exceeding one thousand marks.”42 
This definition—particularly the criterion of deliberateness—left 
jurists considerable leeway in determining what acts were to be 
considered abuse.  Jurist could apply either descriptive or normative 
criteria in making this determination.  Descriptive criteria might focus 
on either subjective or objective facts of the case. These criteria invoke, 
respectively, the nature of the action without regard to its results or the 
effect of the action on its target.  Citing a scholarly consensus around the 
                                                                                                                                 
 41. My discussion here is indebted to DIETHELM KIENAPFEL,  KÖRPERLICHE ZÜCHTIGUNG 
UND SOZIALE ADÄQUANZ IM STRAFRECHT passim (1961).  Like most modern jurists writing about 
the right to discipline, Kienapfel focuses on corporal punishment in schools.  Nonetheless, his 
methodical presentation of the subject provides a nice overview of the legal issues and literature 
relating to the right to discipline.  Id. 
 42. StGB § 223 (1871).  The following sections define and set penalties for assault with a 
weapon, assault resulting in grievous bodily harm.  These types of assault carry greater penalties, 
but the basic definition of assault—the intent to injure—remains the same. 
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definition of abuse as “an improper, severe, ill-intended treatment [ein 
unangemessenes, schlimmes, übles Behandeln],” Diethelm Kienapfel 
remarks that “severe [schlimm]” corresponds to the objective nature of 
the crime, “ill-intended [übel]”  to its subjective nature.43  All acts of 
discipline would be included under a strictly descriptive concept of 
abuse; discipline is deliberate by nature.  In contrast, the adjective 
“improper [unangemessen]” points to a normative definition of abuse.  
Such a definition becomes necessary, the common argument goes, 
because certain actions, like discipline, that clearly meet the descriptive 
criteria of criminal abuse are just as clearly not considered abuse in their 
broader social context.  A popular analogy here is with surgery.  This 
analogy is far from innocent because it allows a legally and socially 
controversial issue, corporal punishment in schools, to be placed in an 
area of near social unanimity, the efficacy of invasive surgery. 
The admission of normative criteria into the definition of criminal 
abuse, as well as other crimes, alters the balance between the nature of 
the act (subjective and/or objective) and the intentions of the actor.  This 
legal position at the fulcrum, which Kienapfel describes as the “dualistic 
concept” of abuse, ideally allows the educative use of corporal 
punishment while describing its limits: viciousness in the application of 
discipline or injury to the body.44  However, legal practice, particularly 
in the colony, could not maintain this equilibrium.  Once intention 
became central for colonial jurists in the determination of criminality, 
the statutory limits to the exercise of the right of discipline potentially 
lost relevance.  While excesses of discipline still might be clearly 
recognized by courts, the defendant’s intent to commit a crime assumed 
a central role.  In all cases, the courts regularly considered ignorance of 
an act’s illegality to provide partial or complete exoneration.  Still, 
(un)awareness of illegality proved especially relevant to discipline/abuse 
cases because the law recognized a category of physical assault 
(discipline) as legitimate.  Merely claiming to have exercised right to 
discipline suggested one’s intentions had not been illegal. 
A case decided in 1880 by the Reichsgericht, the German high 
court, illustrates the difficulties in clearly defining the threshold between 
corporal punishment and criminal abuse.  The case involved a teacher 
                                                                                                                                 
 43. KIENAPFEL, supra note 41, at 28-29. 
 44. Injury to honor is also relevant to the issues of both bodily discipline and criminal abuse.  
The Prussian Law of Domestics stated that the physical punishment of a servant was not to be seen 
as an injury to his honor.  A child’s honor, too, seems to have been unaffected by discipline, while 
the honor of natives appears never to have been addressed by colonial courts, administrators, or 
jurists. 
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who, in disciplining a boy, had “gone beyond the appropriate measure” 
without, however, causing permanent injury to the boy’s health.45  The 
lower court acquitted the teacher on the grounds that the state of Lippe’s 
law governing schools called for criminal prosecution of acts of 
excessive discipline only if they caused lasting injury to the student’s 
health.  Other instances of over-zealous punishment would be handled 
by school officials.  The Reichsgericht rejected this reasoning, asserting 
instead that the StGB superseded state law, and therefore only it, 
unconstrained by any state statute, provided the definitions of crimes.  
Because such a literalist interpretation of the StBG would leave no room 
for any legal discipline, the high court swiftly retreated.  “The 
presupposition of punishability,” it wrote in the same opinion, 
is illegality; so long as state law, within its jurisdiction, grants officials 
the right to dicipline, such an act, in the execution [of state law] and 
within the bounds of the same, does not fall under criminal law, even if 
it presents itself objectively as assault in the sense of the Penal Code.46 
Here, the court allowed state law to limit the StGB; the former 
could define discipline—its means, objects, and occasions—which 
would not then be considered illegal and actionable under the criminal 
law.  The criminal code and criminal process would become relevant 
only when the limits of right to discipline had been transgressed.  This 
allocation of law-making authority, presented by the Reichsgericht as an 
assertion of the StGB’s preeminence, actually conceded to states the 
power to define criminal assault independently of criminal law. 
One reason the court could not find solid ground is that its decision 
spanned several areas of law.  Right to Discipline, might stem from 
administrative law (for state employees), private law (for parents and 
                                                                                                                                 
 45. RGSt 5 (1880), 10(10).  “[H]at der angeklagte Lehrer bei der Züchtigung des Knaben G. 
das rechte Maß uberschritten; indessen ist die Züchtigung für die Gesundheit des Knaben ohne jede 
nachteilige Folge geblieben.”  Id. (Author’s translation: “Did the accused teacher’s discipline of the 
Boy G. exceed the appropriate measure, inasmuch as no permanent damage to the boy’s health 
resulted from it?”).  “5. 1. Wie sind die dem Lehrer erlaubte, die bloß disciplinell strafbare 
Züchtigung und die von dem Lehrer begangene strafbare Körperverletzung eines Schülers von 
einander abzugrenzen?”  Id. (Author’s translation: “5.1. How do you distinguish between those 
things that the teacher is allowed to do, [excessive] discipline merely punishable by disciplinary 
measures, and criminally punishable assault?”). 
 46. Id. at 12.  This sentence amounted to a standard formula for such cases; see also RGSt 97 
(1883) 302, 302 (“97. Steht die Nr. 6 der preußichen Kabinettsordre vom 14. Mai 1825 betr. die 
Schulzucht (G.S.S. 149), nach welcher ein Mißbrauch des Züchtigungrechtes nur, wenn dem Kinde 
eine wirkliche Verletzung zugefügt ist, an dem Lehrer im gerichtlichen Wege bestraft werden kann, 
noch zu Recht?”)  Id.  (Author’s translation: “97.  Is Nr. 6 of the Prussian Cabinet Order of May 14, 
1825 concerning discipline in schools, according to which a teacher can be prosecuted by a court 
only when an abuse of the right to discipline results in a real injury to the child, still valid law?”). 
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private teachers), or even church law (for teachers in religious schools). 
Thus, in discipline/abuse cases, criminal courts found themselves in the 
peculiar position of having to decide the legality of statute in another 
realm of law.  In the present case, after seeming to leave the substance of 
right to discipline for others to determine, the Reichsgericht reasserted 
its prerogative to limit the right according to its reading of criminal law.  
Right to Discipline, the court declared, must serve the “physical and 
mental development of pupils” and “the scope of this right will be 
determined and limited by this aim.”47  The consequences of discipline, 
the severity and longevity of its marks on the student’s body, afforded 
the means to judge whether or not the teacher had overstepped these 
limits.  “Discipline which threatens the [child’s] physical or mental 
integrity lies outside the scope of the teacher’s permitted disciplinary 
authority.”48  Having strayed beyond this authority, an accused teacher 
could no longer call on right to discipline in his defense.  In trying to set 
the boundary of criminal behavior, the court inevitably ended up 
defining the goals and extent of a teacher’s prerogative to discipline 
students under state law.  This attempt merely represented the obverse of 
the case’s original position to which the court objected: the limitations 
on criminal prosecution set by state law. 
The Reichsgericht resolved its dilemma by breaking the continuum 
between discipline and abuse at a point determined by intentionality.  
“[Discipline is] punishable as assault if the teacher knowingly 
overstepped the right to discipline; that is, he was conscious that his act 
was excessive.”49  The court stressed the actor’s intentions; he had 
committed a crime if “he disciplined in order to mistreat.”50  This 
emphasis provided a logical solution to the problem, but failed on a 
practical level to address those very same borderline discipline/abuse 
cases at issue to begin with.  Intention may be easy to determine in 
extreme cases of abuse; claims to have been merely exercising right to 
discipline can be readily dismissed if, for example, a teacher stabbed or 
shot a student.  However, such claims cannot be easily decided, or 
decided at all, in liminal cases of abuse.  One can easily imagine a 
teacher, who in anger hit a child too many times or with a stick instead 
of a switch or on the back instead of the hands, plausibly claiming not to 
have properly understood the legal limits of right to discipline, as settlers 
accused of criminal assault against natives often did in South West 
                                                                                                                                 
 47. RGSt 5 at 13  (“[D]ie körperliche und geistige Entwicklung des Zöglings. . . .”). 
 48. Id. at 14. 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. Id. at 15  (“[E]r züchtigt, um zu mißhandeln.”). 
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Africa. 
B.  The Historical Development of Right to Discipline in Prussian Law 
of Domestics [Gesinderecht]. 
Tracing the historical and legal development of right to discipline 
with an eye to its application in the colony proves a somewhat less 
straightforward task than it might seem at first glance.  The difficulty 
arises from colonial jurists’ failure to ground the right legally—at least 
in regard to the discipline of workers—in any clear way.  Colonial courts 
merely asserted the existence of right to discipline without explicating its 
legal basis.  This tactic appeared necessary in light of contemporary 
developments in metropolitan law.  These developments cast serious 
doubt on the right to discipline of anyone except teachers and parents.  
Thus, the real legal foundation for the colonial right to discipline lay in 
all but obsolete laws of the early nineteenth century.  Of course, at that 
time there was no German national state and thus no German law per se, 
raising the question of which of the German states’ laws concerning 
discipline were relevant to the colonial situation.  For a number of 
reasons, I will trace the development of right to discipline in Prussian 
law, except where the law of the united Germany still clearly recognized 
this right.  Without doubt this choice is the most practical, since much 
nineteenth-century German history focuses on Prussia, but it is also most 
appropriate on a substantive level.  According to the Schutzgebietgesetz, 
Prussian law served as the “default” law of the colonies.51  In other 
words, the legal areas in which individual German states as opposed to 
the federal government had jurisdiction would be governed in the 
colonies by Prussian laws.  The legitimacy of right to discipline in 
Prussian law was therefore relevant to colonial law since the applicable 
law of domestics there would have been Prussian Law of Domestics.  
Further, both the StGB and the German Civil Code [Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, hereafter BGB] derived in large part from the earlier 
Prussian criminal and civil codes.  In a sense, the development of right 
to discipline in the modern period began in Prussian law and culminated 
in the codification of German law after 1871.  And last, in the 
development of right to discipline, the other German states seemed to 
                                                                                                                                 
 51. See SCHUTZGEBIETSGESETZ § 3.  The Schutzgebietsgesetz was the legal code applicable 
in the German colonies.  It is published in its entirety in, among other places, WILHELM HÖPFNER, 
DAS SCHUTZGEBIETSGESETZ UND SEINE ERGÄNZENDEN RECHTLICHEN BESTIMMUNGEN (1907); 
ERNST RADLAUER, ÜBER DEN UMFANG DER GELTUNG DES PREUßISCHEN RECHTS IN DEN 
DEUTSCHEN SCHUTZGEBIETEN passim (1911). 
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have followed a path similar to Prussia’s.  Excepting local peculiarities, 
the history of right to discipline and law of domestics in Prussia can be 
seen as representative for all of Germany. 
Nineteenth-century German law recognized right to discipline in a 
number of areas, which can be broken into two subsets.52  The first of 
these involved the use of discipline as tool for a child’s formation and 
education [Bildung and Erziehung] and was possessed by teachers, 
fathers, and their proxies.  (Mothers, for example, could exercise 
discipline in the father’s absence.)  At the turn of the century, this 
pedagogical use of discipline derived for parents from the BGB and, as 
we have seen, for teachers from various state laws.  The second category 
of discipline was corporal discipline as punishment more strictly 
speaking.  This type of discipline became limited over the course of the 
nineteenth century and, with the exception of the death penalty, 
eventually disappeared.  This category included the right of police 
authorities to punish minor delicts with clearly defined physical 
punishment without recourse to criminal process.53 Physical discipline 
also constituted a criminal punishment in Prussia until 1851, when it was 
written out of the criminal code and the criminal code for all of Germany 
that followed it in 1871.54 
A master’s right to discipline servants fell between these two 
categories.  The historian Reinhart Koselleck, writing about the early 
nineteenth century, placed it squarely alongside a father’s right to 
discipline, but at the latest with the publication of the BGB, the now 
disputed right to discipline servants became distinct from the paternal 
right to discipline.  The legal inclusion of servants and workers on 
estates in the households of their employers may have been appropriate 
in a society ordered by social groups [Stände], but it became 
increasingly out of date over the course of the nineteenth century as 
these workers became citizens, in theory considered equals under the 
                                                                                                                                 
 52. See KOSELLECK, supra note 40, at 641-59.  Viewing the right to discipline from the end 
of the 19th century, my categoriztion differs somewhat from Koselleck’s.  He described three (and a 
half) levels of discipline at the beginning of the century.  The right to “hausherrlichen Gewalt,” the 
use of corporal discipline by police and in the military as punishment for minor offenses, corporal 
discipline as a criminal penalty, and (the half) the technically illegal but continuing use of discipline 
to coerce confession.  Id.  The first category included fathers’ and teachers’ right to discipline 
children, as well as masters’ right to discipline servants, legally considered part of the household 
broadly conceived.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 653-55.  Koselleck points out the difficulty of distinguishing in some rural areas this 
police authority from “hausherrlichen Gewalt,” since estate-owners often also acted as police and 
judges.  Id.  
 54. Id. at 655-56.  The Prussian military no longer legally sanctioned corporal punishment 
after 1808, but some officers continued to physically discipline soldiers nonetheless.  Id.  
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law.  A legal position for servants unequal with and subordinate to their 
employers grew ever more incongruous with the law’s declining 
recognition of status and eventually became untenable.  With the BGB’s 
voiding of employers’ and codification of fathers’ right to discipline, 
these rights were clearly separated.55  An employer’s right to discipline 
continued to be justified in paternalistic (educative) terms, but such 
arguments grew increasingly cynical.  Even for the period discussed by 
Koselleck, employers’ right to discipline concerned order [Ordnung] at 
least as much as education [Erziehung], punishment as much as 
discipline.  In South West Africa, though arguments about right to 
discipline were often couched in terms of Erziehung, customary practice 
included few paternal or reciprocal obligations of settlers toward their 
native workers.  In fact, even contractual obligations seemed to have 
been widely ignored in the colony.  The ambiguity of an employer’s 
Zuchtigungsrecht, its datedness, and its deliberately murky legality all 
made it peculiarly suited to application to indigenous colonial subjects 
who had uncertain legal standing.  A brief sketch of the Prussian Law of 
Domestics’ disposition of right to discipline shows how this legal 
confusion developed around the right and its standing at the time of 
German colonialism. 
The Prussian General Law of 1794 [Allgemeines Landrecht, 
hereafter ALR] provided the basis for Prussian Law of Domestics 
(1810), which was seen as granting the right to discipline in two ways: 
the so-called “direct” and “indirect” right to discipline.  Although the 
exact scope of the law of domestics was not entirely clear, servants 
basically included servants both inside and outside of the house and 
indentured agricultural workers, as opposed to day laborers 
[Tagelöhner].56  Section 227 of the ALR [Section] II granted the so-
called “direct right to discipline.”  This paragraph gave employers the 
right “to hold lazy, disorderly, and rebellious servants to their duty 
through moderate discipline.”57 
Section 227 proved controversial from its promulgation in 1791 and 
particularly after the emancipation of peasants in [Bauernbefreiung] 
1807, the spirit of which it directly contradicted.  Law was moving in the 
direction of representing all (adult male) members of society as equals 
and citizens, while § 227 clearly belonged to a law that ordered society 
                                                                                                                                 
 55. I will explain below why an employer’s right to discipline continued to exist despite its 
nullification by the BGB. 
 56. THOMAS VORMBAUM, POLITIK UND GESINDERECHT IM 19 JAHRHUNDERT 26-34 (1980). 
 57. Id. at 86  (“[F]aules, unordentliches und widerspenstiges Gesinde . . . durch mäßige 
Züchtigungen zu seiner Pflicht anzuhalten”). 
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by status groups [Stände].  Section 227 owed its continued existence to 
an apparent compromise between reformist bureaucrats and conservative 
estate owners.  Representatives of these interests agreed that right to 
discipline contradicted the spirit of the Rechtsstaat [state under the rule 
of law] and the new civil society, but it remained necessary since 
servants were still unable to participate as equals in civil society.58  This 
view held corporal discipline doubly necessary: in the absence of a 
society of equals and as a means of educating servants to such a society.  
One hundred years later, such reasons for delaying servants’ 
achievement of legal equality had much less credibility; a different law 
for servants and “masters” violated the notion of legal equality central to 
the Rechtsstaat.  Consequently, the recognition of right to discipline in 
the colonies reestablished within the Rechtsstaat, but on a new footing, 
the ständisch “master and servant” relationship. 
Despite local rulings against it, for instance in Westphalia in 1825, 
§ 227 remained in effect until 1860 when the Prussian Upper Court 
[Obertribunal] nullified it.59  In 1899, Article 95 of the Introductory Act 
to the BGB definitively eradicated all “direct right to discipline”: “A 
legitimate employer does not possess the right to discipline vis-à-vis 
servants.”  The primary concern of this article was to maintain the 
existing law of domestics.  Such law often restricted the rights of 
servants as compared with other workers and granted the employers of 
servants rights unavailable to other employers.60  This disposition of 
rights resulted in the restriction of servants’ freedom to enter into 
contracts.  Despite these conservative elements, Article 95 did 
unequivocally outlaw right to discipline.  Nonetheless, an indirect right 
to discipline, while controversial, continued to be recognized by some 
courts until the end of Imperial Germany.  Enough powerful 
conservative elements remained in German society at the turn of the 
century to keep alive privileges of rank, like right to discipline.61 
The indirect right to discipline stemmed from II ALR § 77 (dating 
back to 1794).  This paragraph stated: 
If the servant by improper behavior provokes the master to anger and 
                                                                                                                                 
 58. See KOSELLECK, supra note 40, at 641-59. 
 59. Id. at 88-89. 
 60. MICHAEL JOHN, POLITICS AND THE LAW IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL CODE 96 (1989) (discussing the approach to codification).  For example, 
servants were denied the right to form coalitions, a right granted to other workers by the Industrial 
Code.  Id. 
 61. For a discussion of the interplay between the Rechtsstaat and Ständisch relations in 
Prussia, see LÜDTKE, supra note 19. 
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as a result is upbraided or handled a little violently, [the servant] can 
demand no legal redress for this [treatment]. 
The inclusion of this paragraph in the ALR and in the Prussian Law 
of Domestics represented another compromise between conservative and 
reformist impulses.  With § 227 and the direct right to discipline under 
attack and likely to be repealed, § 77 was meant to reassure “masters” 
that they had not lost all control over servants.  For the legal reformer 
Carl Gottlieb Svarez, 
[This] clause is prudently written so that it takes the correct middle 
way between both extremes and leaves enough room to arbitrio 
iudicis, which will always incline toward the masters [Herrschaft] 
anyway, to maintain the necessery respect owed [the masters].62 
While legal equals, the “necessary respect” owed to “masters” by 
their servants needed to be vouchsafed.  Of course the whole notion of 
legal equality became weakened and hierarchical legal relations 
reinforced when law tried to assure one status group the respect of 
another, but not vice versa.  In any case, rather than having the intended 
moderating effect, § 77 was construed as another basis for right to 
discipline.  Article 95 of the Introductory Act to the BGB did not 
directly address this indirect right, so § 77, though controversial, 
remained in force until the beginning of the Weimar Republic when all 
laws of domestics were repealed.  Progressive politicians, especially 
Social Democrats, believed indirect right to discipline to have ended 
with the promulgation of the BGB and its Article 95.  Others, including 
the Prussian interior ministry, believed the opposite.  Using convoluted 
reasoning, the courts agreed with the latter: 
Courts have regularly decided that § 77 of the Prussian Law of 
Domestics, like comparable provisions from other [states’] laws of 
domestics, cannot be abrogated by the Introductory Law to the BGB.  
The aforementioned clause does not recognize the right to discipline 
and, therefore, such a [right] cannot be set aside.63 
Article 95’s purpose, or at least effect, became particularly clear 
here: the law of domestics and the perquisites it accorded to “masters” 
were to be protected even if it meant a narrow construction of servants’ 
putatively equal civil and criminal status.  The effect of such a ruling 
would be to again delay servants’ assumption of full equality under the 
law of the Rechtsstaat. 
                                                                                                                                 
 62. VORMBAUM, supra note 56, at 90. 
 63. Id. at 356-57. 
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What is especially relevant to the colonial situation is the way in 
which § 77, and other aspects of the law of domestics, doubly bound 
criminal law with civil station.  “Masters’” civil standing offered them 
freedom from prosecution for certain crimes, while servants assumed a 
lesser status as victim with regard to those same crimes.  It appears to 
have been a short step between the negative freedom from prosecution 
and the positive right to discipline.  Other aspects of the law of 
domestics shared this quality of modifying status under criminal law.  
The most relevant to colonial history being the restrictions on servants’ 
right to self-defense [Notwehr].  The law of domestics forbade servants 
from “actively resisting” attack except when “the life and health of the 
servant is placed in present and unavoidable danger.”64  This regulation 
reduced servants’ capacity for legitimate self-defense provided under the 
StGB, which allowed self-defense against any “unlawful attack” without 
regard to its (potential) consequences.  The seemingly redundant 
qualification that the threat of injury had to be “present and 
unavoidable” to justify resistance compounded the law’s prejudice 
against servants.  Taken with § 77, the restrictions on Notwehr meant 
that “masters” could exercise discipline without fear of prosecution or 
retaliation.  In fact, since they could not argue that they were acting in 
self-defense, servants who attempted to ward off their employers’ blows 
might now themselves be charged with criminal assault.  As understood 
and applied in the colony, these legal precepts represented more than a 
simple bias in law.  Rather, they accorded with perceptions of relative 
social status: employers in the colony seemed to consider it a genuine 
affront that they could be tried under criminal law for assault against 
Africans. 
IV.  THE COLONIAL DEBATE OVER THE RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE 
The law of domestics clearly provided the background for the 
colonial practice of paternal discipline.  Although, to my knowledge, 
colonial jurists never grounded this practice in Prussian or any other 
state’s Gesindeordnungen, the Colonial Office explicitly recognized this 
source.  In 1907, a confidential report written by Bernhard Dernburg, 
Colonial Secretary, alluded to the pedigree of colonial employers’ right 
to discipline.  Commenting on the habit of “every white” in Dar-es-
Salam (in German East Africa) to “walk around with a whip,” Dernburg 
stated, “the legal basis for this is found in the right to discipline servants, 
                                                                                                                                 
 64. § 79 Allgemeines Landrecht für die preuβischen Staaten [A.L.R.] II 5 (Prussia). 
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according to which every employer is supposedly entitled to moderately 
discipline his servants.”65  Not only were his doubts about a colonial 
right to discipline warranted, Dernburg recognized that the BGB had 
invalidated all right to discipline permitted under the law of domestics.  
Later (1909) instructions from the Colonial Office to the East African 
governor attempted to grapple with this problem.  At issue was “if 
settlers [Pflanzern] have a right, based in custom, to discipline their 
colored workers as was earlier recognized by the German [heimischen] 
law of domestics.”  Article 95 of the Introduction to the BGB would not 
counter this right because “according to § 4 of the Colonial Law it has 
no application to the legal relations between natives and non-natives.”66  
According to § 4, “natives are covered by the jurisdiction fixed by § 2 
and the regulations indicated in § 3 only if determined by an Imperial 
order.”67  This clause made the laws governing the rest of the colonies’ 
inhabitants, namely those outlined in §§ 2 and 3, inapplicable to natives, 
excepting special cases defined by Imperial Order.  Section 4 presented 
African legal standing negatively, excluding them from legal equality 
with German settlers without presenting an alternative legal status for 
them under German law.  The Colonial Office’s opinion used § 4 to 
translate native’s lack of any clear legal status into a carte blanche to 
define that status on an ad hoc basis.  In this case, § 4 functioned to deny 
natives the protections potentially offered by the BGB.  At the same 
time, it remained unclear why German law of domestics applied to 
natives if the Civil Code did not.  Perhaps this problem kept colonial 
jurists from explicitly grounding colonial right to discipline in specific 
provisions of the law of domestics. 
The relation of African labor to white employers, especially on 
farms but also in mining concerns, did in fact markedly resemble the 
master-servant relations that faded in Germany over the course of the 
nineteenth century.  Restrictions on the freedom to enter into contracts 
and the mobility of labor, ordinances against “vagabondage,” and the 
quasi-police powers of settlers vis à vis natives all recalled an earlier 
ständisch [ordered by status] society in Germany.  African farm workers 
seemed to be genuinely part of their employers’ “household,” although 
in the colony a system of debt peonage often replaced any sense of 
paternal obligation.  In other words, colonial law was out of phase with 
colonial society.  Whereas the notion of Rechtsstaat and law, especially 
                                                                                                                                 
 65. FRITZ FERDINAND MÜLLER, KOLONIEN UNTER DER PEITSCHE: EINE DOKUMENTATION  75 
(1962). 
 66. Id. at 79-80. 
 67. HÖPFNER, supra note 51, at 53-54. 
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criminal law, blind to status suffused the legal system and most of the 
laws brought to the colony by Germany, a rigid status system—indicated 
by the Colonial Office’s references to master-servant relationships—
rather than a civil society of equals or potential equals organized 
colonial society.  The issue of right to discipline became salient in the 
colony, then, because it required the reconciliation of modern law with 
relationships of status. 
This attempt to differentiate the legal disposition of status in the 
colony from that in Germany creates an immediate problem.  
Contemporary German law could hardly be said to have ignored status, 
despite the trend just described.  Women and children, socialists and 
Catholics all faced legal discrimination.68  Or even more to the point, 
servants continued to be recognized in German law as occupying a 
unique, albeit increasingly untenable, legal position.  Natives’ treatment 
under German law, then, might appear to be simply an extension of its 
treatment of other so-called minorities.  How was the status position of 
natives in the colony different from that of groups subject to legal and 
social discrimination in Germany? 
Several distinctions must be made here.  First of all, Imperial 
Germany’s outgroups hardly held parallel positions in society or even in 
law.  Many contemporaries viewed legal discrimination against servants 
or Catholics as anachronistic. They felt it contradicted the spirit and 
perhaps the letter of the law in the Rechtsstaat [state under the rule of 
law].69  The legal status of women, by contrast, seemed more natural.  
As one recent scholar of Wilhelminian civil law points out, anti-Catholic 
and anti-socialist laws were considered exceptional, that is, as prima 
facie deviations from the normal rule of law.70  Legal discrimination 
against women and children, in contrast, did not appear exceptional to 
the mainstream, but rather in accord with the essential nature of these 
groups.  Also grounded in their putative (racial) nature, the legal position 
of natives in this respect more closely resembled that of women than 
servants in Germany. 
Claims that colonial corporal discipline furthered natives’ education 
[Erziehung] closely tied the issue to the status of children in the 
metropole.  As we saw above, legal discussions of discipline in Imperial 
Germany usually concerned its use in education.  In the colonies too, 
natives were frequently compared to children, and justifications of 
                                                                                                                                 
 68. See, e.g., DAVID BLACKBOURN & GEOFF ELEY, THE PECULIARITIES OF GERMAN 
HISTORY 243 (1984). 
 69. JOHN, supra note 60, at 2. 
 70. Id. 
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corporal discipline often invoked its pedagogical usefulness.  As 
Ferdinand Müller notes, the term “paternal” discipline is more than an 
incidentally hypocritical euphemism.  It perfectly suits colonial 
“theory’s image of the African as a dependent child,” who must be 
placed under the dominion of white “fathers,” in order to be well 
brought-up.71 
However, the justification of right to discipline by reference to 
education did not translate well into the colonial situation for two 
reasons, one having to do with local political issues and the other with 
the nature of colonial racial ideology.  The political issue concerned the 
position of religious missions in colonial society.  Most missionaries 
advocated the spiritual education of natives, a position which implied a 
measure of equality between whites and natives.  As a result, colonial 
missions were viewed as soft on the “native question,” and the 
promotion of education for natives became associated with the widely 
disparaged “humanistic” approach to “native policy.”72  Therefore the 
legitimation of corporal discipline as a pedagogical tool fit uneasily with 
other aspects of colonial policy.  Presenting discipline as educative was 
also out of step with contemporary, pseudo-Darwinian racial ideology, 
central to which was the belief that natives as a group lagged behind 
whites developmentally.  In this respect, the comparisons of natives to 
children alluded to the belief that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”; 
that is, they were like children, but they were stuck there, that is, not 
individually educable.73  This ideology deferred treatment of natives as 
equals until the distant future, when they as a whole would have attained 
a cultural level commensurate with whites.  Discipline’s representation 
as a means to education, for these reasons, turned out to be little more 
than a way to justify corporal discipline in terms of labor relations.  
Natives were seen as naturally lazy, and “education” became acclimation 
to work; it was as laborer that the native assumed the social position 
appropriate to his cultural development according to colonial ideology.74 
                                                                                                                                 
 71. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 65 (emphasis in original). 
 72. To paint a critic a “humanist” was a common strategy of colonialists.  Not only socialists 
who opposed the colonial project entirely, but any advocate of colonial reform were labelled thus.  
According to colonial hardliners, “humanists” were those who derived colonial policy from beliefs 
in a universal human nature—belief in educability, for example—and a minimal set of natural rights 
for all stemming therefrom.  In contrast, hardliners took the position that only first-hand experience 
with natives  could produce an appropriate “native policy,” which consequently assumed a much 
harsher, “realistic,” means-ends form.  Of course the first-hand knowledge invoked by hardliners 
was no less an ideological construct than the “humanistic” view—what “experience” gave was a 
knowledge of the fundamental inequality of “natives.” 
 73. For an example of this view, see infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 74. Id. 
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In terms of political culture, discrimination against natives was 
closer to the treatment of “reichsfeindlich” groups like socialists.75  In 
these terms, the treatment of natives under law markedly contrasted with 
that of women and children, or of servants for that matter.  The latter 
groups played undeniably crucial roles in social reproduction.  Natives, 
even more so than other “enemies of the Reich,” were seen as apart from 
rather than a part of German society, and at times even as socially 
expendable.76  Legal discrimination against natives in the colonies 
represented, then, an amalgam of the types of discrimination present in 
contemporary German law.  Their socio-economic position most nearly 
paralleled that of servants, but this position was not seen as an archaic 
remnant of a fading social structure.  Colonial law, in this regard, served 
to organize and discipline native labor for the benefit of German 
economic interests.  The legal position of natives was nearest to that of 
women or children because rather than exceptional, it was based in a 
perceived essential nature.  Here, colonial law placed natives in a 
permanent position of racially grounded legal subordination.  Finally, 
politically, the relevant comparison is to so-called “enemies of the 
Reich,” who were subject to exceptional laws.  Colonial law and native 
policy associated with this third position, in part, functioned to secure 
white colonial society against the real or perceived threat of native 
violence. 
This combination of legal bases for discrimination involved more 
than a simple application of existing German laws, like the law of 
domestics, to the colonies.  Although the control of labor remained a 
central interest of right to discipline in the colony as it had under the law 
of domestics, colonial law arguably also represented a new departure.  
Just as turn-of-the century populist movements in the Reich transformed 
politics by mobilizing nationalist and racialist ideas,77 a less noticeable 
legal transformation, employing the same tools, was underway in the 
colonies.  Whether or not this legal culture influenced later unions of 
race and law, colonial legal communities strove to reconcile modern law 
with racially-based social status.  The discourse surrounding the problem 
                                                                                                                                 
 75. A Reichsfeind is an enemy of the Reich (Empire); “reichsfeindlich” is the adjectival form 
of this word. 
 76. Germany’s genocidal military policy during the Herero and Nama uprisings, of course, 
provides the most obvious example of this view.  This view persisted despite the total dependence 
of the colonial economy  on African labor. 
 77. See, e.g., GEOFF ELEY, RESHAPING THE GERMAN RIGHT: RADICAL NATIONALISM AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE AFTER BISMARCK (1980) (discussing the evolution of the German Right); 
PETER PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY & AUSTRIA (1988) 
(providing an account of the period of increased anti-semitism in the two countries). 
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of right to discipline presents a microcosm of this legal transformation.  
It reflected attempts to define a unique legal position for natives as 
victims of criminal violence. 
There were two legal realms of corporal discipline in the colony, 
police discipline [Prügelstrafe] and employers’ (paternal) right to 
discipline.  Colonial law explicitly regulated the former, limiting the 
extent and nature of the punishment, listing all who held this authority, 
and laying out the protocol for carrying out and recording such 
punishment.  Of course, in the colony police could not discipline white 
settlers but only natives.  Police discipline had been made illegal in 
Prussia in 1848, so members of German civil society could no longer 
receive corporal punishment.78  This type of discipline matched that 
formerly held by police authorities in Germany, which punished minor 
delicts outside the notice of criminal law and had more to do with social 
discipline than criminal punishment.  It functioned as the official form of 
employers’ right to discipline; employers were to bring offending 
workers to the police for discipline.  “In most cases corporal punishment 
was imposed, in accord with its primary function, against so called labor 
delicts . . . ‘laziness,’ ‘continual indolence,’ ‘negligent work,’ 
‘disobedience,’” and so on.79  Police discipline warrants attention 
because it showed the deliberate extension to natives of a type of 
corporal discipline seen as outdated in Germany.  But it does not fit into 
the framework of the present discussion, since it concerns administrative 
rather than criminal law, that is, this type of discipline never seemed to 
result in charges of criminal assault.  This chapter focuses on the second 
sort of discipline, that of the employer, since it was here that the 
threshold between right to discipline and criminal abuse was established. 
It bears repeating that the colonial right to discipline of employers 
in South West Africa had no clear basis in positive law.  This fact 
became especially clear in an exchange between a reform-minded local 
official and deputy governor Oskar Hintrager in 1912.80  The local 
official, a von Roebern, strongly objected to the customary practice of 
discipline, blaming it for the strained “native relations.”  Apparently 
suspicious of discipline’s legal basis, Roebern asked for clarification and 
offered his own argument for the illegitimacy of the current practice.  
Reasoning from the term “right to paternal discipline,” Roebern ventured 
                                                                                                                                 
 78. LÜDTKE, supra note 19, at 123. 
 79. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 81-82. 
 80. Hintrager was a hard line official with a long tenure in South West Africa.   OSKAR 
HINTRAGER, SÜDWESTAFRIKA IN DER DEUTSCHEN ZEIT (1956) (recounting his memory of this 
period). 
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that the BGB paragraph (§ 1631) describing a father’s right to discipline 
over his children provided the source of the colonial right to discipline.  
He then caviled against this paragraph’s application in the colony.  He 
argued that this paternal authority could be delegated to wives or 
mothers only under strictly defined circumstances (BGB § 1684), and 
that it could not be granted to white supervisors or foremen at all.  But in 
the colony all these people regularly exercised discipline, complained 
Roebern, and “if the miserable Hottentot so much as raises his arm in 
defense, this is taken as ‘attempted assault’ and the native is hauled 
before the judge for violently threatening a white.”  Noting that the BGB 
protected children against abusive fathers, Roebern asserted that the 
validity of one paragraph meant the validity of the other.  “[For] 
practical [reasons], the loss of the paternal authority to punish ought to 
be made known publicly in the official gazette [Amtsblatt].”81 
In response, Hintrager denied the need for clarification of the right 
to discipline.  Colonial courts had ruled, he said, “that according to 
common law the master [Dienstherr], his family, and [his] white 
employees, under whom natives work, possess the right to mild 
discipline vis-à-vis natives.”82  This right, he continued, did not stem 
from BGB § 1631 as Roebern supposed, but rather merely resembled it 
in many respects.  The existing practice of the right to discipline did not 
present a danger to natives or native relations because its transgression 
constituted assault [Körperverletzung]—an act that would elicit both 
criminal prosecution and administrative measures to prevent the 
offending businesses from receiving more workers from government 
procurers.83 
A second letter from Roebern repeated his original points and 
objected to Hintrager’s complacency.  Colonial courts did not provide 
enough protection, and administrative restrictions on workers were 
easily circumvented.  According to Roebern’s estimation as police 
officer, native commissioner and head of administration, “[e]very 
conflict with natives leads to excessive paternal discipline. . . . If the 
colony is again guided to a shipwreck in the native question, then we 
will have the paternal right to discipline to thank.”84 
                                                                                                                                 
 81. Strafbefugnisse weißer Dienstherrn gegen ihre farbigen Angestellten, Generalia 
[Authority of white supervisors to punish their colored laborers], ZENTRALBUREAU DES 
KAISERLICHEN GOUVERNEMENTS [ZBU] 717, FV q.1, 3r-3v (on file with National Archives of 
Namibia). 
 82. Id. at 2r-2v (emphasis in original). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 3r-3v. 
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Ignoring Roebern’s concerns, another deputy governor named 
Kornmayer responded that the colony had not yet reached a position in 
which it could set aside the right to discipline; in the absence of 
extensive police authority, farmers could not manage without this right.85  
Roebern’s concerns found a more receptive ear with yet a third official, 
native Commissioner Streitwolf.  Streitwolf agreed that colonial 
disciplinary practices could lead to a “shipwreck.”  Lacking any 
statutory grounding, he reasoned, the right to discipline was “therefore 
clearly illegal [direkt ungesetzlich].”  This illegal situation, perpetuated 
by colonial courts, ought to be abolished by explicit order.86 
I have described this exchange in some detail because it introduces 
many of the issues relating to colonial right to discipline.  The first thing 
that ought to be said about the right to discipline, namely, that it was 
“clearly illegal,” came almost last in this exchange.  No statute granted 
employers the right to discipline their workers physically.  In fact, the 
explicit delegation of this authority to police officials might seem to 
contradict settlers’ claims to possess this right.  However, as Hintrager 
asserted, the colonial courts recognized discipline as a “customary right” 
adhering to any white in a position of authority over a native.  In a 
decision from 1911 sometimes cited as having established the right to 
discipline, the colonial upper court reasoned thus: 
White employers [Dienstherr] in the colony cannot entirely be denied 
a right to mild [gelindes] discipline separate from official criminal 
authority.  The upper court has heretofore always held this view and it 
has no occasion to deviate from it.  The white employer has not only 
the bodily needs of his natives to care for, but, if he takes seriously his 
task as conveyor of heimischer culture and morality [Gesittung] to the 
natives, also works toward their development into orderly and useful 
people.  Among other things, this development involves that they 
become accustomed to structured labor, feelings of obligation, and 
obedience.  The character of the native, however, does not always 
allow him to attain these [goals] without a certain amount of coercion, 
and therefore, a mild right to discipline cannot be completely 
dispensed with.  Because in respect to morals and intellect [Geist] on 
the average natives are no more highly developed than a child in need 
of education at home.  For each offense, for each case of disobedience 
or insubordination, the employer cannot easily go to the official 
criminal authority . . . Here he must have the authority, if remonstrance 
and admonition do not suffice, to apply discipline, as an energetic 
                                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 3v. 
 86. Id. at 4r. 
27
Schwirck: Law and Violence in German South West Africa
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
SCHWIRCK1.DOC 1/6/03  2:47 PM 
108 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:81 
means of education.  A strong box on the ears or a fitting blow with a 
crop to the back or the bottom often works better than all talk.87 
The definition of this right as “gelindes” staked out a moderate 
administrative position in this debate.  Defenders of the right to 
discipline would typically describe the act of discipline as “a few boxes 
on the ears,” a description which cast critics’ concerns as exaggerated.  
But while the debate about the right to discipline often focused on such 
“mild” forms of discipline, the cases reaching the courts made clear that 
in actual custom discipline was usually administered with a sjambok, 
stick, or the like.  In the case just quoted, for example, the victim was 
tied between the front and back wheels of a wagon and beaten on the 
back with an Ox whip. 
The various participants in abusive acts also spoke very little of 
discipline as an educative tool.  More often, defendants justified 
excessive discipline as a response to disobedience or crimes allegedly 
committed by the victim or natives in general.  These crimes then 
provided the context in which to understand a violent act far exceeding 
the limits of discipline set by the court.  In other words, abusive settlers 
became angry and mistreated Africans rather than consciously applying 
discipline in the service of education.  Settlers seemed to beat Africans 
as a means of “frontier justice.”  Colonial courts firmly rejected the view 
that settlers had the general authority to take criminal justice into their 
own hands, insisting instead that discipline was a pedagogical tool.  In 
doing so, the courts ignored discipline as it was actually practiced in the 
colony while at the same time providing it with a legitimating argument. 
There was a gap between the reality of discipline and its definition 
by newspapers, administrators, and courts.  This fact meant that Roebern 
and Hintrager were talking at cross purposes.  Roebern expressed the 
potential danger in the actual practice of discipline, while Hintrager 
dismissed his anxiety by reference to the presumptive practice.  The 
latter’s reassurance that colonial courts acted as an effective sanction 
against transgressions of the right to discipline extended this reasoning 
according to an ideal practice.  One ought to be skeptical of such a 
claim, not necessarily because of bad faith on the part of colonial judges, 
but rather because it assumed that the courts served as an adequate 
counter to excessive discipline.  Given the limits to administrative 
authority in the colony and the difficulty Africans had in making 
complaints against whites, the threat of penalty for going beyond “a few 
                                                                                                                                 
 87. Kaiserliches Bezirksgericht Keetmanshoop [Imperial District Court Keetmanshoop] 
[GKE], Akte 295, D 4a/10, 82r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/3
SCHWIRCK1.DOC 1/6/03  2:47 PM 
2002] LAW AND VIOLENCE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 109 
boxes on the ears” must have seemed very slight.  Hintrager was being 
disingenuous; he knew of the colonial realities intimated by Roebern.  It 
is not so clear, however, why he maintained this willful ignorance. 
In fact, the central colonial administration had strongly expressed 
its concern about the mistreatment of natives  under the guise of corporal 
discipline on at least two separate occasions prior to the current 
exchange.  In 1908, colonial governor Schuckmann noted “various 
recent cases in which settlers” had severely mistreated “their natives” 
and asked local officials to report on such cases in their districts.  
Schuckmann viewed the issue as a labor problem and the lack of 
adequate legal protection for natives as a danger to efficient organization 
of the colonial work force. 
If the native first had been convinced that he not only would be 
regarded as a man, but also that his justified complaints [berechtigte 
Aussprache] would be taken into account and that he was protected by 
the law, then he would not have as much inclination to run away from 
his employers [Dienstherrn].88 
While narrowly defining the problem as one of labor, 
Schuckmann’s association of legal protection with being “viewed as a 
man” implicitly broached the broadest problem of law’s social meaning.  
In a letter to the Colonial Office, Schuckmann described the issue in 
more general legal terms: 
[I]t has proved to be a great disadvantage, that the native’s respect for 
our administration of justice [Rechtspflege] has doubtlessly been 
severely harmed.  Because of the great distance to our courts and their 
excessive workload [Überlastung], grave abuses of natives that have 
taken place on remote farms do not first reach the courts until the 
native has gotten the feeling that the perpetrator will be released 
[ausgehen] unpunished.89 
Here, the problem became less one of labor than of native respect 
for the German legal system.  This system’s failure to punish white 
abusers of natives represented not only a threat to labor relations, but 
also a blow to the integrity of German law itself. 
In 1912, current Governor Seitz expressed even stronger concern 
about the legal disposition of discipline/abuse cases.  In a secret circular 
to local officials, Seitz lamented the “despairing mood” among natives 
                                                                                                                                 
 88. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Generalia [Abuse of natives by whites], 
ZENTRAL BUREAU DES KAISERLICHEN GOUVERNEMENTS [ZBU] 2054, W III r.1, Bd.1, 1r-2r (on file 
with the National Archives of Namibia). 
 89. Id. at 3r-3v. 
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arising from the failure of courts to punish “brutal outrages [rohe 
Ausschreitungen]” of whites against them.  Seitz viewed this situation as 
a severe danger to the German presence in the colony itself: 
Natives, who doubt the impartiality of our judicial decisions, would be 
driven thereby to a blind hate of everything that is white and ultimately 
to self-defence, i.e., revolt.  It is obvious that these feelings of hatred 
among the natives, if not energetically redressed, must lead sooner or 
later to a renewed, desperate, native uprising and consequently the 
colony’s [Land] economic ruin.  It is also in the interest of the entire 
white population that elements who rage against the natives with 
senseless ferocity and consider their white skin as a license to commit 
brutal crimes be neutralized in every way.  A people that makes a 
claim to be considered a ruling people [Herrenvolk] must above all 
else keep its own house in order.  If the crimes of whites against 
natives occasion no or inadequate penalty, it is impossible in the long 
run to respond to the crimes of natives against whites with the severity 
required by the general interest.90 
Seitz’s memo addressed the three primary justifications of corporal 
discipline—labor, security, and race—and used each of them to advocate 
stronger prosecution of abuse cases.  Continued injustice would produce 
hatred and violence causing “the economic ruin” of the colony.  
Mistreatment of natives belied German claims to the title of Herrenvolk.  
Whether from conviction or for rhetorical reasons, Seitz’s jeremiad 
invoked only German interests rather than, for example, concern for 
native welfare.  In other words, in the contemporary context the same 
ideology used to legitimate white discipline of natives was also deployed 
in arguments against abuse. 
Seitz’s memo also located itself at the intersection of race, violence, 
and the law.  At the same time that he implicitly congratulated German 
law for its impartiality, he also associated it with all things white.  For 
Seitz, not only the principles of justice but also the obligations of the 
master race demanded punishment of settlers who mistreated natives.  
By claiming that native crimes against whites could only be adequately 
punished if white crimes against native were too, Seitz was advocating 
legal reciprocity rather than legal equality for natives.  This sentiment 
reflected the noblesse oblige a master owed his household in a society 
structured according to status, but in German South West Africa race 
determined status. 
Seitz’s invocation of the colonial economy spoke to those who felt 
                                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 7r-7v. 
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that the native had to be acclimated to work through physical discipline 
or at least justified abuse in this way.  Settlers with a more global 
interest in the colonial “common good,” defined in economic terms, 
would probably have included established farmers and traders and the 
larger businesses, such as mining.  Seitz’s memo would have appealed to 
their sense of social superiority not only to natives but also to the less 
wealthy or prominent white settlers whom they employed.  By citing 
“those elements of the white population, who rage against natives with 
senseless brutality,” Seitz strengthened his case vis-á-vis those who 
defined themselves against such elements.  Such elements, finally, 
would have come from among settler-laborers who often worked as 
foremen over native workers.  For them, the discipline of natives likely 
expressed their ressentiment against their social “betters” as much as it 
did their sense of racial superiority over natives.91 
As a deputy governor, Hintrager must have been aware of these 
memos and the concerns behind them, and yet continued to frustrate 
Roebern’s attempt to deal with the issue.  The murkiness of Hintrager’s 
motivations may have arisen out of the mixed legal and cultural basis of 
colonial right to discipline with which this section began.  Colonial right 
to discipline’s most obvious purpose was to discipline labor.  Writing on 
this issue, colonial historian Fritz Müller argued that the inability of 
German colonizers to deprive natives of the means of subsistence 
entirely—through war, confiscation, and so on—necessitated the use of 
extra-economic coercion to create a work force useful to German 
economic interests.  The various violent means used to compel labor, 
Müller argued, carried over into the workplace itself.  “In order to break 
the resistance of the oppressed worker against a truly murderous 
exploitation, almost all of the employers in the German colonies reach 
for the lash.”92  However, this argument falters precisely in this last step. 
While the various forms of impressment served colonizers’ economic 
interests, violence toward Africans in the workplace—sometimes so 
severe that the worker could no longer work—did not.  As Schuckmann 
and Seitz among others argued, excessive violence undermined the 
colonizer’s ability to fashion and maintain a productive native labor 
force.  It was, in fact, the prescribed extent of discipline—a few boxes 
on the ears—that was widely seen as best suited to the colony’s 
economic ends.  Hintrager’s stance, in other words, did not accord with 
                                                                                                                                 
 91. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS Essays I & II (Walter 
Kaufmann ed. & R. J. Hollingdale trans., Random House, 1967) (discussing the concept of 
ressentiment). 
 92. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 33. 
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the most apparent and perhaps primary function of colonial right to 
discipline: labor discipline.  He turned a blind eye to the negative 
effects—to German interests—of the actual practice of corporal 
punishment. 
The reason for Hintrager’s position and discipline’s other 
“purposes” prove harder to determine because they may not have been 
economically instrumental.  Kornmayer’s brief interpolation in the 
exchange hints at another possible purpose behind the refusal to perceive 
the practice of discipline as other than the ideal.  He viewed the right to 
discipline as an alternative to extensive police authority and a safeguard 
to white security, rather than as a way to control labor.  This sort of 
thinking suffused debates about the right to discipline, but the logic 
behind it was not clearly articulated.  Whether or nor they were correct, 
settlers, especially in outlying areas, often saw themselves as threatened 
by “natives,” including those whom they employed.  Stories of native 
workers poisoning settlers occasionally appeared in colonial newspapers, 
but they were invariably unsubstantiated and often turned out to be 
untrue.  In the prominent trial of Elisabeth Ohlsen, a “farmer’s wife,” for 
manslaughter [Totschlag], white witnesses repeatedly alleged a 
conspiracy to poison the Ohlsen’s and their livestock.93  Such assertions 
did not clearly fit in with the logic of the defense’s argument because it 
claimed that Ohlsen had not struck the decisive blows, and her exercise 
of the right to discipline never exceeded a slap or a box on the ears.  
Further, no one claimed that killing of the victim, Deubib, came in 
response to the poisonings.  Still the tenor of the argument was that an 
amorphous threat from natives justified an excessive beating, in this case 
to death.  The court accepted this argument and acquitted Ohlsen.  The 
juxtaposition of poisoning, discipline, and violent assault implied that 
Ohlsen had attacked Deubib in self-defense, although clearly something 
else was going on in this case. 
A contemporary article about the Ohlsen case shared this confusion 
about the discipline/abuse issue.  The article, “Lessons of the Ohlsen 
Trial,” perfunctorily denied Ohlsen’s guilt but devoted much more 
energy to expressions of outrage over the fact of the trial itself.  In its 
view the problem with discipline was not the tendency for it to become 
abuse, but that this abuse could be prosecuted in colonial courts.  Since 
such cases invariably required assessing the relative merits of white and 
                                                                                                                                 
 93. Farmerfrau Elisabeth Ohlsen wegen Totschlags [Trial of farmer’s wife Elizabeth Ohlsen 
for manslaughter], Gericht Windhoek [Windhoek Court] 728, 3K9/11 (on file with the National 
Archives of Namibia). 
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native testimony, the article complained about the assumption of “legal 
equality [Gleichgerechtigkeit]” between the races in colonial law.  
Arising from the State’s Attorney’s Office’s exaggerated desire to keep 
natives  from feeling “rightless,” such legal equality insulted white 
honor more than it endangered settlers: 
Inasmuch as one is willing to take the feelings of the natives into 
consideration, then surely no white, e.g., who knocks down a native in 
self-defense ought to go unpunished!  We would think that the feeling 
of rightlessness among the natives would not be lessened but perhaps 
increased if they believed themselves to have full legal equality with 
whites.  If natives are allowed to think that they are legally equal to 
whites, then it is all over with the preservation of the distance between 
white and black that is the precondition for a useful employment 
[Verwendung] of natives.94 
Here we have Seitz’s reasoning in reverse; legal protection for 
natives ran counter to colonial interests.  Of course the concerns about 
native legal equality with settlers were hyperbolic given the explicit 
exclusion of natives from the jurisdiction of regular German law, but 
they still gleaned an element of truth.  For, if settlers were to be held 
responsible for crimes against natives, then criminal law did provide the 
latter with a measure of protection qualitatively the same as it provided 
for the former.  Although the passage includes reference both to security 
and economic issues—self-defense and “useful employment of 
natives”—its deeper concern seemed to be the maintenance of a certain 
relative racial status.  Like Hintrager, the article denied the actual 
practice of discipline while espousing administrative practices that 
would allow it to continue unhindered. 
Arguments about security, in fact, seem more like ideological 
justifications of the practice of discipline than accurate descriptions of 
colonial reality, which is not to say settlers did not sincerely believe 
themselves in peril.  For instance, rather than feeling immediately 
threatened by Deubib, Ohlsen most likely went too far in administering 
“discipline,” and it was courtroom exigencies that elicited the link with 
the alleged poisoning conspiracy.  In this case, again, we are left 
wondering why the practice of discipline differed from the stated norm, 
and why the court, in turn, cooperated in the restatement of the illusory 
ideal as reality.  The practice of discipline may have stemmed as much 
from beliefs about the status and nature of natives as from rational 
                                                                                                                                 
 94. Lehren des Ohlsen-Prozeßes [Lessons of the Ohlsen Case], SÜD-WESTBÖTE, December 
23, 1911 (emphasis in the German original). 
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impulses to control labor or secure life and property.  This possibility 
makes the most sense of Hintrager’s position, which now can be seen as 
mediating between the ideal protection of natives under modern criminal 
law and their actual social and cultural position as essentially inferior.  
The material issue of physical discipline or abuse was subordinated to a 
discursive cycle of legal argument and evasiveness that deferred the 
problem’s resolution.  This discourse described discipline that deviated 
from the norm as something else, on the one hand, as self-defense in 
Ohlsen’s case or, on the other, abuse.  Neither alternative addressed the 
difficulties of grounding the real practice of discipline in modern law.  
Rather than seeking a new basis for a sort of discipline that contradicted 
current German law, Hintrager and others could simply deny its nature.  
By doing so, settlers could continue to employ physical abuse to express 
and maintain their “superior” racial status. 
Corporal discipline, then, was many things.  It can first be defined 
as the actions that accompanied the intent to discipline, actions that 
generally ranged from a few boxes on the ears to a beating with a 
sjambok.  Specific instances of such discipline largely remained beyond 
the notice of colonial officials, courts, and publicists; it stemmed from 
the right possessed by white “masters” according to a custom derived 
from racialist “truisms” rather than tradition.  The courts sanctioned this 
violence by calling it “mild discipline.”  Only in the very general 
ways—like in Schuckmann or Seitz’s memos—was this discipline cast 
as violence.  Next, corporal discipline constituted a trope in a legal 
strategy on two levels.  In specific cases, the placement of an abusive act 
on a continuum of discipline altered and mitigated the nature of the 
crime.  As we see in the Ohlsen case, the story of Deubib’s death turned 
on issues like discipline or self-defense, which provided the best 
possible construction of Ohlsen’s intentions.  As a more general legal 
strategy, the figure of corporal discipline legitimated a certain level of 
white violence against natives by placing it outside of the concern of 
criminal law.  The exclusion of disciplinary acts from criminal 
prosecution meant that the minimal level of violence against Africans 
visible to the colonial judicial system was greater, that is more violent, 
than the minimal level of violence against whites.  Corporal discipline 
provided a means to control labor and a way to reinforce relative racial 
status.  Alternatively, it might be spoken of as a safeguard to settler 
security or as a tool for the cultural education of “natives.”  These 
different meanings of corporal discipline each informed the right to 
discipline debate in varying degrees. 
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V.  DISCIPLINE IN THE MINES 
The labor issue constituted the most immediate, and perhaps 
determining, context for the right to discipline debate as a whole.  It was 
toward the end of the German colonial period, when diamonds were 
finally discovered and mining became an important enterprise, that the 
issue of the right to discipline first came into prominence.  The 
widespread use of corporal punishment on farms was carried over into 
the mines.  A number of differences between mine and farm labor most 
likely now forced the issue of discipline into the forefront.  First of all, 
the labor forces differed in the two types of undertaking.  Farmers 
tended to employ local Africans, who lived permanently in the vicinity 
and were expected to renew their contracts indefinitely.  The mines, in 
contrast, employed chiefly migrant workers, who returned home upon 
the expiration of their relatively brief contracts.  The greater mobility 
and turnover of miners brought the issue of discipline/abuse into greater 
relief.  More people became aware of the practice of discipline, they 
traveled throughout the colony with this knowledge, and stories of abuse 
became an impediment to the recruitment of new contract workers.  A 
second difference in the circumstances of farm laborers and miners lay 
in the location of their work.  Mining took place in the relatively large 
population concentrations created by the mines themselves, whereas 
farms were remotely located.  This fact made discipline/abuse more 
visible in mines, and the existence of a proximate police authority 
around them allowed acts of abuse to be prosecuted more easily.  Also 
with the mines and the resulting intensive labor practices, the colonial 
government created the post of “Native Commissioner,” a local official 
among whose tasks was the representation of natives in legal matters. 
Exchanges between mining interests, local officials, and central 
administrators laid out the issues and positions concerning the right to 
discipline most clearly and in the greatest detail.  Although specific 
instances of discipline/abuse provided the context for these exchanges, 
they dealt mostly in generalities and thus illustrate the strains between 
the central administration’s interest in preventing abuse, local 
administrators’ concern with protecting their own positions, and mining 
concerns’ desire for free rein in conducting their business.  The 
particular abuse cases, in turn, supply an indispensable template for 
understanding these exchanges—only through them we can understand 
how the abstractions of this relatively rarefied exchange translated into 
colonial labor practices.  These exchanges and cases not only allow a 
glimpse into colonial reality, but also offer a window onto the interplay 
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between sociocultural practice and law.  The exchange described below 
shared a familiar quality with other conflicts over “native policy.”  The 
various participants all claimed to agree on the basic issue, so the dispute 
seems to be about details, the best way to achieve a common goal.  But 
when the superficial agreement to limit abuse is examined more closely, 
one finds that it conceals widely divergent positions.  This fact becomes 
especially clear when the rhetoric is placed next to labor and judicial 
practices. 
All parties in the discussion of discipline in the mines shared an 
ostensible concern with South West Africa’s economic well-being.  This 
fact ought to allow one to understand the issue in terms of conflicting 
economic interests, but this does not prove to be the case.  Rather, as 
with discipline on farms, discipline in the mines cannot be understood 
simply in terms of economic instrumentality.  The various participants in 
the exchanges concerning such discipline had differing motivations.  
Certain local and central administrators came closest to sincerely 
wishing to provide physical security to natives.  They justified this aim 
by pointing to its beneficial effect on the colonial economy.  However, 
such arguments may have displaced humanitarian or paternalist ones, 
which had become untenable in the colony after the uprisings.  Other 
officials, again both local and central, while also invoking the danger to 
the economic good posed by the abuse of natives, showed themselves to 
be in fact resistant to any government interventions that strove to 
minimize instances of abuse.  The central administrators who fell into 
this category claimed to be helpless before the letter of the law.95  It may 
be that these high-ranking officials, like Deputy Governor Oskar 
Hintrager, who in contrast to the governor served for long periods of 
time, resented the intervention of those officials, including the governor, 
more politically motivated and more closely associated with the Colonial 
Office in Berlin.  Resistant local officials may have felt similarly about 
interference from Windhoek into matters close at hand, which they felt 
they knew best.  Business interests, who also lamented the abuse of 
natives, sought to portray the discipline/abuse problem as a private 
matter between employer and employee. 
Left out of these discussions, except for their participation in court 
cases, were the abusers themselves and their victims.  The former hardly 
seemed interested in the economic efficacy of their violent acts.  Mine 
foremen, rather, used abuse to position themselves socially.  Their 
                                                                                                                                 
 95. On “helplessness” as a means to legitimate unjust uses of law, see ROSS, supra note 3, 
ch.3. 
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willingness and ability to act violently toward natives without 
repercussion expressed their sense of racial superiority to natives.  
Racial domination compensated for their otherwise weak social position 
among whites.  The courts viewed such violence as a natural response to 
the colonial situation and cooperated in establishing an exculpatory 
context for it, often by invoking racial difference in their rulings in abuse 
cases. 
In 1911 a local official in Lüderitz, the center of the diamond 
mining industry, wrote to the local mining chamber, a private 
organization, to complain about the frequent employment of previously 
abusive whites as foremen over natives.  Citing the mines’ own interests, 
the official, Assessor Heiligbrunner, requested that such whites be fired 
or moved to jobs without oversight of “natives.”  The Imperial Mining 
Office, the Native Commissioner, and he agreed, Heiligbrunner 
concluded, to use “police orders” to assure that “unsuitable people are 
not used in such positions (e.g., as foremen or sortierer) in which they 
have direct oversight over natives.”96  The chairmen of the mining 
chamber professed ready agreement with Heiligbrunner’s central point: 
whites who had mistreated natives should not occupy supervisory 
positions.  But, they hastened to add, labor discipline had been 
“noticeably” deteriorating and “cases of disobedience and brazen 
impudence on the part of natives are becoming ever more numerous.”  
The chairmen attributed this state of affairs to recent efforts of the native 
Commissioner, who, through his solicitation of complaints, “appears to 
have given rise to the opinion among the natives that the white 
supervisors cannot tell them what to do, and whether or not any work 
gets done simply depends on their good will.”97  The chairmen reserved 
their strongest objections for Heiligbrunner’s claim of police authority in 
the matter, calling it “a serious encroachment on private rights.”98  They 
would “gladly” voluntarily follow the practice Heiligbrunner suggested, 
but the members of the mining chamber would not allow administrators 
to determine whom they hired and fired.  “Criminal law alone suffices to 
render harmless people who groundlessly mistreat natives.  Everything 
else must be left to the discretion of the employer, who can judge best if 
an employee is more useful or harmful to their business.”99 
On the surface, this conflict seems only to have concerned a 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 66 (on 
file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
 97. Id. at 67. 
 98. Id. at 68. 
 99. Id. at 68. 
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somewhat abstract question of legal principle, namely, the limits posed 
to police power by private rights.  As for the substantive problem, local 
officials and mining interests appear to have agreed completely that 
abusive whites should be fired or transferred to another job.  However, 
the chairmen’s digression about “disobedience and insolence” among 
native workers points to another reading and belies their claim that 
criminal law adequately protected natives from mistreatment.  On the 
one hand, they criticized the native Commissioner’s pursuit of native 
complaints against abusive whites as undermining employers’ authority, 
while on the other, they invoked the very same practice as a sufficient 
safeguard of “natives.”  Beneath the mining chamber’s ostensible shared 
concern for native life lay a strenuous call for a laissez-faire policy on 
the part of the colonial government.  Ideally, the chamber chairmen 
seemed to imply, not only would civil law prevent state interference into 
employment policies, but also administrators of criminal law would not 
look too deeply at criminal abuses in the mines. 
A year later the mining chamber made this position more explicit.  
Responding to renewed complaints by Lüderitz Native Commissioner 
Tönjes about labor practices, the chamber reaffirmed and even hardened 
its previous position by dismissing the criticism of the police and courts.  
In a letter written on June 18, the chairmen again acknowledged the 
danger presented to the general good by abusive mine foremen, but now 
implied that alleged incidents of abuse were more a product of 
overzealous colonial officials than unsound labor conditions.  The 
chamber’s letter began, “the assertion of the Native Commissioner that 
numerous instances of abuse occurred upon the establishment of the 
Colonial Mining Association is not true.”  In fact, the chairmen 
maintained, there was less abuse than one would expect in an operation 
with 1,200 employees, “a large proportion of which are insolent and 
unwilling to work.”  If Tönjes “was not led by impractical, excessive 
idealism,” he would realize the soundness of the company’s labor 
practices, particularly given “natives’ characteristic inclination toward 
laziness.”  The chairmen cited the mines’ practice of black-listing white 
employees deemed “unsuitable” for working in the mines, one criterion 
of suitability being “groundless mistreatment of natives” (emphasis 
mine).  However, the letter continued, it would be unjust to fire and 
blacklist an employee for a single abusive act.  Rather, “if in other 
respects [such employees] possess a good character and are proficient at 
their jobs,” the mine ought simply “to warn them against further 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/3
SCHWIRCK1.DOC 1/6/03  2:47 PM 
2002] LAW AND VIOLENCE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 119 
excesses.”100 
The mining chamber’s letter ceded little to local officials’ concerns.  
It implied that instances of abuse in the mines were a reasonable 
response to the intractability of native workers.  The chairmen’s use of 
the word “groundless” indicated that the mines, not the courts or local 
administration, ought to bear responsibility for determining when abuse 
had occurred.  The previous year the mining chamber claimed merely to 
be guarding mines’ legal prerogatives under civil law, while avowing 
commitment to the spirit of administrators’ suggestion that foremen 
found guilty of criminal assault be transferred or fired.  Now the 
chairmen not only would reserve punishment for repeat offenders, but 
also would replace the criminal code’s construction of abuse with their 
own.  A report by the Colonial Mining Association [Koloniale Bergbau 
Gesellschaft) to the mining chamber attached to the latter’s letter 
confirms this impression.  This report explains away instances of abuse 
confirmed in colonial courts, even going so far as to express regret for 
dismissing the only employee it did fire, an employee twice tried and 
once convicted for mistreating Ovambo workers.  Citing the “great 
deceitfulness of the Ovambo”, the report derogated another guilty 
verdict by crediting the defendant’s professions of innocence over the 
conflicting claims of the Ovambo witnesses.  Generally, the report 
rejected the manner in which colonial courts weighed testimony, stating 
“that the testimony of a white witness, who realizes the significance of 
an oath, is worth ten times as much as an Ovambo’s.”101  This report as 
well as the mining chamber’s letter rejected the authority of criminal law 
to set the limits of acceptable violence. 
One might expect the central administration to support the local 
officials in this matter; presumably, they would share a view of the 
relation between the public good and the private interests of the mining 
companies.  Instead, Heiligbrunner’s solicitation of the colonial 
government’s opinion elicited a brusque, strident defense of private 
rights.  Heiligbrunner wrote that police intrusion into private rights 
would be unnecessary if the mines followed the policy they allegedly 
espoused, but that criminal law did not provide sufficient protection 
against mistreatment as long as the mines persisted in returning abusive 
whites to supervisory positions.  Oskar Hintrager, employing the same 
sort of myopic legal formalism we encountered above, summarily 
rejected Heiligbrunner’s view.  Hintrager called a police decree 
                                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 116r-117r. 
 101. Id. at 118r-122r. 
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mandating the universally preferred policy “legally impermissable.” In 
support of this claim, he cited a law that limited the use of administrative 
penalties to acts not already punishable under criminal law.102  Although 
here silent on the issue, we can assume Hintrager would have contended 
that criminal law afforded not only adequate but also the only legitimate 
protection to native workers. 
A year later, in the spring of 1913, Hintrager still maintained this 
position.  A Lüderitz district official  at that time renewed the complaints 
about the mining concerns’ labor practices.  The official, a certain 
Böhmer, described a recent increase in instances of abuse, ascribing it to 
a surfeit of native laborers: “when there are enough workers, they [mine 
administrators] no longer believe that they have to pay as much attention 
[to mistreatment of natives].”103  Böhmer laid out a detailed argument 
against Hintrager’s finding of the previous year, which, Böhmer 
objected, “tied the hands” of local officials.  Beside dismissing mining 
interests’ tactical misrepresentations of the proposed ordinance to restrict 
the employment of abusive foremen,104 Böhmer’s argument can be 
broken into three parts.  First, he explained why criminal process in itself 
could not end mistreatment of native workers in diamond mines, 
detailing the course of a typical abuse case.  “The courts completely fail 
to work,” he wrote.  When the evidence was damning, the lower court in 
most cases imposed a fine, but even this penalty was often overturned on 
appeal.  Unfamiliar with the diamond mines, the upper court judge could 
not understand the conditions that obtained there.  Native witnesses, 
Böhmer continued, had usually returned home in the “long” interim 
between the initial trial and the appeal, so the upper court had to rely on 
“the inadequate transcripts of the first trial.”  In addition, the defendants 
could now shape their arguments to rebut the lesser courts’ findings, an 
especially effective strategy given colonial courts’ tendency to give little 
credit to native testimony when opposed by the testimony of whites 
under oath.  “Thus, the case ends with a glänzenden acquittal,” Böhmer 
concluded.105 
                                                                                                                                 
 102. Kaiserliche Verordnung, betreffend Zwangs- und Strafbefugnisse der 
Verwaltungsbehörden in den Schutzgebieten Afrikas und der Südsee.  Vom 14. Juli 1905 [Imperial 
order concerning authority of colonial administrators to punish, July 14, 1905] 9 DIE DEUTSCHE 
KOLONIAL-GESETZGEBUNG 171 (1906). 
 103. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 156r 
(on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
 104. The Lüderitz mining chamber routinely represented the suggested ordinance as mandating 
the dismissal of abusive whites, for example, while the Lüderitz officials merely called for them to 
be transferred to other jobs.  Id. 
 105. Id. at 156v. 
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Having discredited the assertion that criminal law and process 
afforded native labor ample protection, Böhmer went on to suggest a 
legal basis for an ordinance barring the re-employment of abusive whites 
in supervisory positions over “natives.”  Böhmer would base such a law 
in the “today still fully valid” description of police duties in the ALR, 
which obliged the police “to take the necessary measures to prevent 
imminent dangers to the public or individual members thereof.”106  In a 
gloss on this law, the Prussian upper court in a decision on October 15, 
1894, had granted police authorities considerable discretion in deciding 
when a danger to the “public or its individual members” existed.  This 
danger could not be an “entirely distant possibility,” but nor did the 
police have to wait “until the matter has reached such a point that the 
feared occurrence has become imminent.”  Quoting this decision at 
length, Böhmer argued that a threat to “members of the public and the 
common good [Allgemeinheit]” was more than a “distant possibility” 
when a known abuser of natives worked as a supervisor.  The danger 
inherent in such circumstance was “bodily damage” to workers, resulting 
in “agitation [Erregung]” among them and endangering the smooth 
working of the diamond mines—“thereby causing the greatest harm to 
the common good.”  To Böhmer’s mind, these conditions justified the 
promulgation of a police ordinance.107 
In the third stage of his argument, Böhmer tried to refute 
Hintrager’s contention that the law (hereafter § 14) forbidding 
administrative penalties for criminal acts prohibited a police statute in 
the matter.  This paragraph simply meant, he contended, “that it is not 
the job of the police to protect every individual from the effect of a 
punishable actions, but not that the police ought not to protect the public 
by preventing the punishable acts of individuals” [emphasis in original].  
If § 14 meant as much, continued Böhmer, prevention, the police’s 
“most important” function, would become impossible.108  Böhmer’s 
repeated references to the common good distinguished his letter from 
Heiligbrunner’s of a year before.  It is clear that Böhmer included 
natives in his definition of the public, since he considered them under 
police protection and referred to them several times as among the 
“individuals [einzelnen]” who compose the “public [Allgemeinheit].”  
Nonetheless, Böhmer seemed reluctant to describe native safety as a 
                                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 9 quoting § 10 Allegemeines Landrecht [A.L.R.] II 17 (Prussia). § 10 II. 17 ALR.  
The ALR was the “default” law in the colonies when no specific colonial law applied. 
 107. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 157v-
158r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
 108. Id. at 158v. 
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good in itself.  Rather, the insecure position of indigenous labor 
represented a danger to the colonial economy, harm to which caused the 
“greatest damage to the public.”  This position may not have reflected 
Böhmer’s true beliefs, but rather enabled him to make an argument for 
native safety, which would have been rejected out of hand if grounded in 
native interests or a humanitarian appeal. 
In response to Böhmer, Hintrager acceded to his representation of 
the problem: instances of abuse had increased, and the courts were 
failing in their prosecution of such cases.  Hintrager, in other words, here 
contradicted his earlier argument to Roebern that criminal law and the 
courts sufficed to protect natives from abuse—the claim also made by 
the mining chamber.  However, Hintrager still insisted that § 14 allowed 
only “direct force in the protection of the population’s life and health,” 
which would exclude an ordinance like the one Böhmer proposed.  
Instead, in order to redress the worker mistreatment problem, Hintrager 
suggested that labor recruiters should no longer place Ovambo workers 
at negligent mining companies with the determination of negligence 
made by the local Bezirksrat.109  Hintrager avoided answering Böhmer in 
terms of the common good, referring instead to the “population 
[Bevölkerung],” a group which may or may not have included Africans. 
Hintrager’s opinion elicited strong protest from Böhmer.  
Hintrager’s suggested solution would not improve the situation, Böhmer 
objected.  While such a plan might be effective for sanctioning abusive 
farmers, it would have little effect on mining concerns.  Ovambos were 
recruited for all mines as a group, not for individual companies; the 
recruiter had no say in how the workers were divided among the mines.  
Putting aside the impossibility of impartial judgment by a body largely 
composed of “diamond interests,” the Bezirksrat simply was not up to 
the administrative task of assessing how each of about 300 white 
foremen treated native workers.  Expecting the Bezirksrat to perform 
this function delegated “a pure police” responsibility onto a “body 
formed for entirely other ends”—a body not answerable in terms of civil, 
criminal, or administrative law as the police were.  Absent a law barring 
abusive whites from supervisory positions, the police were “completely 
powerless and the district office is then no longer in the position to 
assume responsibility for the proper treatment of natives in the field.”110 
                                                                                                                                 
 109. The Bezirksrat was the local organ of South West African system of self-rule.  Like their 
central counterpart, the Landesrat, it could pass resolutions, but these did not possess the authority 
of law. 
 110. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 169r-
170v (on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
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In rejecting Böhmer’s further protestations, the central 
administration, this time in the form of Regierungsassessor Kornmayer, 
again called upon the restriction on administrative penalties for criminal 
acts (§ 14).  According to a ruling of the Prussian Upper Administrative 
Court [Oberverwaltungsgericht], the police could not impose penalties 
for acts already punishable under criminal law.  A later decision by the 
same court authorized the police to assess fines, not in cases of 
individual crimes, but when necessary for “the elimination of the illegal 
or unauthorized [polizeiwidrigen] state of affairs caused by them [the 
individual cases].”  Kornmayer judged, however, that this decision had 
not yet been accepted “in the literature,” and besides it was “doubtful” if 
this decision included the circumstances at the mines about which 
Böhmer and others complained. 
Besides, the decisions of the Upper Administrative Court are not based 
in . . . a specific law, but rather simply in the belief [Erwägung] that 
the police ought not increase through police regulations the 
psychological pressure arising from threat of lawful punishment. 
A police decree barring abusive foremen from positions overseeing 
native laborers would violate § 14 by replicating the StGB paragraphs 
concerning physical assault.111 
In legal terms, Kornmayer’s opinion returned to the initial defense 
of the status quo: native labor was adequately protected by criminal law.  
In the eyes of the central administration, criminal law provided not only 
sufficient, but also the only protection of natives from abuse allowed 
under law.  Hintrager and Kornmayer, therefore, represented their 
position as deriving from a strict attention to positive law, regardless of 
colonial ideologies concerning native social status.  But as we have seen, 
other interpretations of positive law—namely those of Heiligbrunner and 
Böhmer—left ample room for the issue to be decided either way.  Legal 
formalism functioned here to prevent the problem from being stated 
openly, namely the respective value to the common good of native safety 
or the relative freedom of whites to mistreat natives.  The central 
administration steadfastly refused to address the problem in these terms 
even when Böhmer’s letters invited it to do so.  By refusing to 
acknowledge any of the legal precedents proffered by the local officials 
and repeatedly invoking § 14, the central administration avoided having 
to make, and perhaps recognize, the explicit argument that continued 
mistreatment of native labor was preferable to effective sanction against 
                                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 171r-172r. 
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abusive whites.  In fact, it did just the opposite and joined all the 
interested parties in lamenting the ongoing mistreatment of native labor.  
How do we explain this contradiction? 
Again, if we simply look at material or economic conditions of the 
colony, neither the mines nor the government gained by acquiescence to 
abusive treatment of African labor.  Rather, as Böhmer argued cogently, 
mishandling of workers would ultimately prove harmful to the mines 
and, by extension, the colonial economy.  Acknowledgment of this point 
accounted for the mining chamber and the central administration’s 
blandishments against abuse.  For administrators, devotion to the law 
itself also may have served as a counterweight to the tuggings of racial 
ideology.  That is, violating the law, no matter its racial or ideological 
valence, transgressed the social order.  On the other hand, there seems 
little to explain administrators’ and mining interests’ countenancing of 
violence toward Africans except as an embrace of a putative racial order 
which paired native inferiority with ambivalence about settlers’ violence 
against natives.  In this ideology’s context, rejection of violence against 
natives by those in powerful positions, whether in government or 
business, may have represented more distaste at the excesses of (white) 
social inferiors than outrage at injustice.  Such violence, like the 
mistreatment of animals, warranted legal redress only in the most 
abhorrent cases. 
In the foregoing exchanges, the central administration seemed to 
occupy an extreme position virtually identical to that of mining interests.  
However, if we take stock of the ideological positioning occurring 
alongside this legal and policy debate, we will find that the central 
administration actually occupied a moderate position between colonial 
reformers and hard-liners.  This fact becomes clear in a close 
examination of a particular abuse case.  The investigation and trials of 
August Günther, a mine foremen, prove doubly revealing: they lay bare 
the violent reality that underlay the somewhat abstract legal debates and 
suggest why the colonial criminal justice system failed to protect 
Africans from abuse at the hands of settlers. 
The file for the Günther case began with a most unusual telegram 
from colonial governor Theodor Seitz.  Dated May 28, 1912, and 
contemporary to the debates described above, this note demanded an 
explanation for the Lüderitz district office’s failure to appeal a previous 
abuse case against one Rudolf Stangenberg and ordered it to appeal the 
pending case against Günther in the event of acquittal.  While it was not 
uncommon for the colonial governor to weigh in with an opinion about 
judicial administration generally, it was odd for him to offer his views of 
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individual cases, all the more so in the Günther case since it had not yet 
reached court.  Rather than simply expressing himself on a 
administrative matter, the practice of appeal as a whole, Seitz implicitly 
imputed guilt to Stangenberg and Günther.  Seitz’s action presents an 
image of a colonial administration actively seeking to curb abusive 
treatment of native labor—an image far different from the one elicited 
by the bureaucratic stonewalling described above.  Still, Seitz’s stance 
accorded in a way with Kornmayer and Hintrager’s views: if the 
criminal justice system alone was to protect natives from mistreatment, 
it must pursue such cases aggressively, even if after the sort of 
aggressive prodding that Seitz did here. 
Seitz’s interest in the Günther case prompted revealing attempts by 
local officials, now thrown on the defensive, to define their own roles in 
the administration of justice and protection of native safety.  These 
efforts show how the various officials responsible for the realization of 
native policy viewed and carried out their roles, and why the colonial 
administration and courts ultimately failed to protect Africans from 
abuse.  Both Heiligbrunner, a Lüderitz official, and Regierungsassessor 
Zorn, who acted as state’s attorney in the Stangenberg and Günther 
cases, responded to Seitz’s extraordinary intercession.  As representative 
of the state and the party responsible for pursuing appeals, Zorn’s report 
of June 3 revealed a man strenuously defending himself against Seitz’s 
implicit criticism of his performance.112  There seemed to be two errors 
made by local officials in the handling of the Stangenberg case: the 
failure to enter a formal petition to the court [Antrag] in a first instance 
of abuse, which also ruled out an appeal, and the lackluster attempt to 
prove Stangenberg’s guilt in another instance.  Zorn more or less 
explicitly placed the blame for these missteps on Native Commissioner 
Tönjes, the man who initially complained to Windhoek about the case’s 
handling. 
Zorn began by arguing that the lack of evidence in one count of 
abuse forced him to request a fine rather than imprisonment as 
punishment, despite his own conviction that a crime had occurred.  The 
weakness of the case against Stangenberg resulted from lapses in the 
preparation of the case, the responsibility of investigating officials, 
namely, the police, the Native Commissioner, and so on.  The state’s 
attorney, on the other hand, first became active in the case during the 
main proceedings [Hauptverhandlung], which included the questioning 
                                                                                                                                 
 112. For the role of the state’s attorney [Staatsanwalt] see WLADIMIR LINDENBERG, RICHTER 
STAATSANWÄLTE RECHTSBRECHER: BETRACHTUNGEN EINES SACHVERSTÄNDIGEN 42-25 (1965). 
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of witnesses under oath and the judge’s decision.  Zorn went on to 
explain that he assumed his position in Lüderitz a few months after the 
crimes had occurred and had only learned of the case, “apart from, 
perhaps, a couple of casual conversations,” seven days before the main 
proceedings.  He was, therefore, not responsible for the failure to enter a 
petition to the court.113  While Zorn was accurate in asserting that the 
State’s Attorney was excluded from the pretrial investigation, this fact 
did not mean that he had no responsibility for presenting the petition.  
The StGB gave anyone over the age of eighteen the right to enter a 
complaint, and the author of the handbooks on colonial legal process 
asserted that this right extended even to natives.114 
Zorn attributed the failure to present sufficient evidence against 
Stangenberg to the Native Commissioner’s negligence.  Although 
Tönjes testified that the defendant had beaten one victim with a “thick 
stick, “Zorn said, he did not present this stick as evidence before the 
court, so that the court not only disbelieved that the victim had been 
struck with a thick stick, but also did not even consider it proven that the 
Ovambo had been struck with the thin stick Stangenberg himself showed 
to the court.  Zorn chided Tönjes for taking the word of the Ovambo 
witnesses at face value, noting that in another case they had “lied badly.”  
Whereas Zorn had previously cited his ignorance of the case to explain 
his failure to file a complaint, now he attributed this failure to the 
obligation of the State’s Attorney not to enter a complaint lacking 
definitive proof. 
Once again in the Stangenberg case, the central evidentiary issue 
was the credibility of native witnesses.  Zorn criticized Tönjes for basing 
his case on such testimony, which in the colonial context amounted to 
legal incompetence.  However, Tönjes had taken great pains to establish 
the credibility of the Ovambo witnesses and, presumably, to make their 
testimony acceptable to a skeptical court.  These witnesses had been 
reluctant to testify when Tönjes first questioned them and denied that 
any abuse had occurred.  Only after the Native Commissioner asked 
                                                                                                                                 
 113. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 87r-
87v (on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
 114. See FRIEDRICH DOERR, DEUTSCHES KOLONIALSTRAFPROZESSRECHT 110-11 (1913).  The 
South West African situation, at least, was not this clear cut.  One criticism of the colonial legal 
system often made by settlers’ was that Africans could too easily bring complaints against whites.  
Since the Native Commissioner was to assume the responsibility of making legal complaints on 
behalf of Africans, the creation of this office can be seen as offering something to both settlers and 
“natives.”  However, it is doubtful that before the appointment of these commissioners that Africans 
could  very easily or did very often bring complaints against whites, nor is it clear that afterwards 
this right was denied them entirely. 
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/3
SCHWIRCK1.DOC 1/6/03  2:47 PM 
2002] LAW AND VIOLENCE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 127 
Stangenberg to leave the area did they become more cooperative.  Even 
then, Tönjes divided the Ovambo workers into two groups and 
questioned them separately, testing the honesty of each group against the 
other.115  Still, the court summarily dismissed  the Ovambo’s story, 
underscoring the difficulty in having such testimony considered a 
component in the “facts of the case” as construed by the court.  For his 
part, Zorn could cite the dishonesty of natives and the resultant lack of 
evidence because these conditions were axiomatic in the colonial 
context. 
Coming to the crux of the matter—the implication of incompetence, 
Zorn complained that during several discussions Tönjes had given him 
no indication of his displeasure with the verdict in the Stangenberg case 
before writing to Windhoek.  Zorn wrote that he assumed from Seitz’s 
telegram that “the Native Commissioner gave an account [of the 
situation] that really deviated substantially from the actual development 
of the case, although it should not be said that the Native Commissioner 
consciously spoke falsely.”  As for the Günther case, which was still in 
the pre-trial phase, Zorn objected most strongly to the suggestion that he 
had been negligent in the Stangenberg case, and he would also prove so 
in the Günther case.  The Native Commissioner must not be allowed to 
trespass on the authority of the State’s Attorney’s Office, an office 
which in the performance of any of its duties, Zorn vowed, always 
considered natives’ well-being. 
In his cover to Zorn’s letter, local administrator Heiligbrunner 
seconded the State’s Attorney.  Heiligbrunner, who acted as an associate 
judge [Beisitzer] during the case, believed there was no definitive proof 
that Stangenberg had even once overstepped the limits of the right to 
discipline, although Heiligbrunner personally was convinced that he had 
done so and that the presentation of more testimony would have brought 
about his conviction.  He did not place much faith in legal appeals, as it 
had been his experience that appeals by the State’s Attorney’s Office 
usually brought lighter, not heavier penalties, an effect of the upper 
courts’ lay judges’ misunderstanding of the relationship between natives 
and whites and the lag time between the first trial and appeal.  As for 
Günther, Heiligbrunner had asked the Colonial Mining Association to 
remove him from his position overseeing native workers, but the mine 
had refused to do so unless the court convicted him.  In taking this 
                                                                                                                                 
 115. Betriebsführer R. Stangenberg wegen gefährlicher Körperverletzung [Foreman R. 
Stangenberg for aggravated assault], Gericht Lüderitz [Lüderitz Court], 3D 23/12, 1r-2r (on file 
with the National Archives of Namibia). 
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position, the mine pointed to Hintrager’s finding on the matter, which 
the mine now interpreted, without demurral by Heiligbrunner, as 
forbidding the termination of workers as punishment for “physical 
discipline of natives.” 
How was the Günther case finally decided?  The Lüderitz district 
court’s decision on August 7 contained two accounts of the case, the first 
based on the testimony of native witnesses and the second on white 
testimony.  According to the former, Kambali, Gunther’s victim, was 
bringing lunch to his fellow Ovambo mine-workers when Günther called 
out to him “Wambo, Wambo.”  Kambali moved quickly to Günther, who 
gave him “four strong boxes on the ear.”  Kambali turned to run from his 
attacker, but Günther kicked him in the back of the knee and then twice 
in the seat of the pants.  The Ovambo fell to the ground and then rose 
and resumed his flight, whereupon Günther set his dog after him.  
Catching up to Kambali, Günther threatened him with a stick but did not 
strike him.  When he returned to the other Ovambos, Kambali could not 
eat, complained of severe pain, and was bleeding from his genitals.  
Kambali started on his way to the clinic, but collapsed and a “black 
cook” had to help him the rest of the way.  All the native  witnesses, of 
which there were five including the victim, testified that Kambali had 
taken no action that could be construed as an attack on the defendant.116 
Needless to say, the tale told by Günther and a white witness 
differed substantially from this account of the crime.  Both described 
Kambali as “lazy and rebellious,” citing the complaints made by 
Supervisor Smith, the second white witness, against him for 
“insubordination and indolence.”  Smith had complained to Günther 
about Kambali shortly before the incident in question.  Smith recounted 
that when Günther boxed Kambali’s ears for failing to respond to his 
calls quickly enough, Kambali raised his arms in an attempted attack.  
(At this point in the testimony, the court cautioned Smith to be truthful; 
the decision related that “the witness Smith stood by his story in spite of 
the judge’s stern warnings against perjury.”)  Another witness standing 
about 60 meters away corroborated Smith’s story, claiming “that 
Kambali sprung at the accused with raised arms, and that he [the other 
witness] understood this as a hostile attack.”  Then Günther grabbed 
Kambali, spun him around, and kicked him only once in the seat of the 
pants.  Smith and Günther denied that the latter had kicked Kambali on 
                                                                                                                                 
 116. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 96v-
97r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia). 
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the knee.117 
“Despite considerable misgivings,” the court accepted Smith and 
Günther’s account of the event.  The court’s open suspicion that the 
white witnesses had perjured themselves—indicated by “stern warnings 
against perjury” and “considerable misgivings”—was unusual in such a 
case.  The fact that the court still chose this testimony over the 
conflicting account to construct the “facts of the case” again highlights 
just how reluctant colonial courts were to believe Africans when their 
stories contradicted whites’.  This preference for white testimony was 
not simply the result of bias, but a product of the very structure of a 
colonial legal system that would not allow natives to testify under 
oath.118  In the Günther case, the court avoided this issue by reasoning 
that Günther’s belief that he was under attack was genuine even if the 
attack itself was not.  The court, in fact, stated that “a black laborer’s 
attack of a white supervisor [Dienstherren] is very unlikely.”  The 
court’s reasoning rested on two assumptions: that Günther’s boxing of 
Kambali’s ears was a legitimate act of discipline (an assumption made 
explicit in the decision) and that, therefore, any subsequent attempt by 
Kambali to stop Günther was not an act of self-defense but itself an 
assault.  Through this reasoning, the court tacitly acceded to an aspect of 
the Prussian Law of Domestics that we have encountered above, which 
considered resistance to discipline to be criminal assault inexcusable by 
an appeal to self-defense.119 
Still, the court refused to accept Günther’s kicking of Kambali as an 
act of self defense, since he turned the victim prior to kicking him and 
thereby had already “quite deliberately” removed the danger to himself.  
Given the severity of the injury to Kambali, damage to the urethra and 
an adjacent artery, the court deemed Günther guilty of deliberate 
physical assault [vorsätzlich Körperverletzung].  The court set aside the 
mandatory prison sentence and instead found a fine of 400 marks 
sufficient punishment, finding, as usual, a number of mitigating 
circumstances.  The defendant worked with “a difficult and inept 
                                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 97r-97v. 
 118. STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE ÜBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DES REICHSTAG, 12. 
Legislatur-Periode, I. Session (1907/1909) 7257.  Sitzung, March 2, 1909, 7271.  Colonial Secretary 
Bernhard Dernburg proposed to the Reichstag that Africans be allowed to testify under oath, but his 
suggestion was rejected.  For settlers’ reactions see Der Negereid [The Black Man’s Oath], 
WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, July 14, 1909 and Der Negereid nach Dernburgs Anschauung 
[Dernberg’s View on The Black Man’s Oath], WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, April 17, 1909. 
 119. Der Negereid [The Black Man’s Oath], WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, July 14, 1909, at 56, 
and Der Negereid nach Dernburgs Anschauug [Dernberg’s View on the Black Man’s Oath], 
WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, April 17, 1909, at 31. 
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workforce” and was “badly angered by the least imagined attack on the 
part of Kambali.”  And although the assault might have “easily 
endangered” Kambali’s life, the attack did not result in permanent injury 
to the victim.120  Under pressure from the colonial administration and 
itself skeptical of the white witnesses’ credibility, the court might have 
been expected here to impose a prison term.  Instead it fell back on a set 
of extenuating circumstances—the “natives’” putative nature and the 
defendant’s anger—that could and were easily seen as applicable to 
many colonial situations. 
Just as Governor Seitz had demanded, the state’s attorney, as well 
as Günther’s lawyer, appealed the case.  And just as Heiligbrunner 
predicted, the Upper Court overturned the original verdict and acquitted 
Günther.  This court’s narrative of the case began with Kambali’s 
alleged attack on Günther; it deemed the defendant’s initial attack on 
Kambali, the “four strong boxes on the ears,” irrelevant.  Now the court 
simply had to judge Günther actions “as the result of an unforeseen and, 
coming from a native, particularly astonishing attack.”  Günther may 
have over-reacted, the upper court ruled, but his anger at the time 
excused this response.  While this account diminished the story’s 
coherence, making it seem as if Kambali attacked Günther without 
cause, legally it made perfect sense.  Because the boxes on the ear were 
legitimate corporal discipline, they became transparent to the court.  
Superficially, the initial act of discipline was irrelevant to the Lüderitz 
court’s decision as well.  The court had found it so unlikely that a native  
would attack a white that it doubted the witnesses who claimed this had 
happened.  This approach skirted the corporal discipline issue.  Was 
Günther’s initial attack on Kambali legitimate discipline?  Was 
Kambali’s response, then, self-defense or criminal assault?  Instead the 
Lüderitz court asserted that no matter what the circumstances or 
Günther’s understanding of them, his response to the alleged assault was 
excessive.  The Upper Court, in direct contrast, found the unprovoked 
attack of a native on a white so inflammatory as to justify an excessive 
response.  Although corporal discipline was not explicitly central to 
either court’s decision, ultimately both decisions revolved around this 
issue.  In convicting Günther, the lower court endeavored to establish the 
enforceable limits of discipline, while the Upper Court’s decision 
blurred such limits. 
As a whole and within each of its parts, the colonial administration 
may have sincerely desired to protect Africans from violence at white 
                                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. at 99v-100r. 
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hands.  Administrators and representatives of mining interests again and 
again expressed the belief that the colonial common good and economic 
well-being depended on the fair treatment of native workers, and we 
have no reason to doubt their sincerity.  These arguments also 
represented the limited degree to which administrators could advocate 
native interests for their own sake.  It would have made perfect sense for 
colonial actors to sacrifice the jobs of a few abusive white foremen for 
the sake of healthier “native relations.”  However, administrators and 
entrepreneurs seemed unable to make this sacrifice.  Given the 
reluctance of officials and employers to believe Africans and the 
hindrances to the latter making complaints to colonial courts, one reason 
certainly was that abuse occurred much more frequently than indicated 
by administrative and court records.  There were more than “a few” 
abusive whites working in the mines.  Moreover, even if this were not 
the case, structural impediments made it unlikely that any individual 
case could be decided in an African’s favor.  Individual racial prejudice 
certainly played a part, but more important was relative criminal and 
civil status of white and Africans under colonial law. 
The colony’s civil law as set out by the Schutzgebietgesetz did not 
define the civil status of natives.  As we have seen above, § 4 of this law 
explicitly excluded natives from legal provisions obtaining for whites, 
reserving to the Kaiser the authority to make laws for natives.  Since 
most such laws were restrictive in nature.121  Natives were rightless 
under German law.  Criminal law might have been a potential exception 
to this rightless condition.  While as suspected criminals natives did not 
have the same protections as whites, e.g., from arbitrary imprisonment, 
German criminal law made no explicit distinction between white and 
native victims.  If one central purpose of criminal law is protection of 
life and property, then the criminal law in South West Africa as written 
seemed to include native life and property within its scope.  However in 
practice African lack of civil status undermined their protection under 
criminal law and vice versa.  One somewhat indirect example, alluded to 
above, is the matter of oaths.  The prohibition on natives testifying under 
oath meant that courts had to grant more credibility to white testimony 
even apart from the common characterization of natives as congenital 
liars.  As a result, in cases with African victims there was no 
                                                                                                                                 
 121. Such laws were exemplified by and culminated in the Native Regulations of 1907, which, 
among other things, denied Africans the right to hold property, subjected them to vagrancy and  
pass laws, and limited their ability to freely enter into labor contracts.  See Verordnung betreffend 
Maßregeln zur Kontrolle der Eingeborenen,  Vom 18. August 1907, in 11 DIE DEUTSCHE 
KOLONIAL-GESETZGEBUNG (Köbner and Schmidt-Dargitz  eds., 1907). 
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counterweight to the procedural rights of whites.  More directly, courts 
and administrators explicitly favored the private rights of entrepreneurs 
and white workers over African’s tenuous claim to safety under criminal 
law, as became clear in the debate about police measures to protect 
natives in the mines.  Of course, the right to discipline stands as the most 
obvious instance of a white civil right weakening the protection of 
Africans under criminal law; it redefined a range of criminal activity as a 
civil right of white adults vis-à-vis natives.  In so doing, the right to 
discipline cleared a space in which much mistreatment of Africans could 
take place without social or legal sanction. 
In colonial Namibia, legal institutions both responded to and helped 
shape violence toward Africans by settlers.  Many settlers and officials 
did not view corporal discipline of Africans as a form violence.  By 
countenancing this discipline and some of its excesses, legal institutions 
effectively distributed the ability to effect legitimate violence while 
obscuring its violent nature.  In hindsight, we clearly recognize the 
violence inherent in the so-called “right to paternal discipline.”  
However, our own legal culture may help to obscure and legitimate acts 
of violence that are not widely recognized as such.  For example, 
criminal law constructs violence as an individual’s intentional acts.  This 
construction disguises the arguably violent nature of preventable harms 
people suffer as workers or consumers or of voluntary acts that 
contribute to or indirectly cause these harms.122  A detailed, contextually 
sensitive analysis of such harms and their treatment by law and legal 
institutions is one way to begin to uncover such violence. 
                                                                                                                                 
 122. See John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 192, 194-98 
(1974) (defining as violent the harms that stem, for example, from “conditions of [persons’] lives 
that [ones] work or lack of work forces upon them”). 
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